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Deregulation, Distrust, and Democracy:
State and Local Action to Ensure Equitable
Access to Healthy, Sustainably Produced
Food
Lindsay F. Wileyt

Environmental, public health, alternative food, and food justice advocates are
working together to achieve incremental agriculturalsubsidy and nutrition assistance
reforms that increase access to fresh fruits and vegetables. When it comes to targeting
food and beverage products for increased regulation and decreased consumption,
however, the prioritiesof variousfood reform movements diverge. This article argues
that foundational legal issues, including preemption of state and local authority to
protect the public's health and welfare, increasing FirstAmendment protection for
commercial speech, and eroding judicial deference to legislative policy judgments,
present a more promising avenue for collaboration across movements than discrete
food reform priorities around issues like sugary drinks, genetic modification, or
organics. Using the Vermont Genetically Modified Organism (GMO) Labeling Act
litigation, the Kauai GMO Cultivation Ordinance litigation, the New York City Sugary
Drinks Portion Rule litigation, and the Cleveland Trans Fat Ban litigation as case
studies, I discuss the foundational legal challengesfaced by diverse food reformers,
even when their discrete reform priorities diverge. I also explore the broader
implications of cooperation among groups that respond differently to the
"irrationalities" (from the public health perspective) or "values" (from the
environmental and alternativefood perspective) that permeate public risk perception
for democraticgovernance in the face ofscientific uncertainty.
I. INTRODUCTION
Our food system-the food that's available in stores, restaurants, schools,
workplaces, and our homes; how it is produced and sold; how it is consumed and by
whom'-has crucial implications for our health and our environment. Converging food
t Lindsay F. Wiley is an Associate Professor of Law at American University, Washington College of
Law. A.B., Harvard University; J.D., Harvard Law School; M.P.H., Johns Hopkins University.
See generally BRUCE W. MARION, THE ORGANIZATION AND PERFORMANCE OF THE U.S. FOOD

SYSTEM (1986) (discussing the impact that industrialization and internationalization of the food system in
the United States has had on production and distribution of food).
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reform movements are fostering coalitions among environmental, public health,
alternative food, and food justice advocates who share an interest in equitable access to
healthy, sustainably-produced food. Working together, these groups are increasing
access to fresh fruits and vegetables through incremental agricultural subsidy and
nutrition assistance reforms.2
When it comes to the food and beverage products targeted for increased regulation
and decreased consumption, however, the priorities of the various food reform
movements diverge. While public health advocates are seeking to reduce
overconsumption of sugar, salt, and unhealthy fats, environmental and "alternative
food" advocates are seeking to reduce our reliance on genetically modified (GM,
otherwise known as genetically engineered) foods and our exposure to pesticides,
herbicides, and chemically-processed ingredients. 3 As one Internet meme puts it,
"There are too many people counting calories, and not enough people counting
chemicals." 4 Many public health advocates view measures that target "unnatural"
production methods (involving genetic modification and synthetic herbicides and
pesticides) as a distraction from more pressing concerns. Some food justice and
alternative food advocates are seeking to deregulate unpasteurized dairy products and
small-scale food production, adopting a libertarian perspective counter to the proactive
government role that public health groups advocate.6 Moreover, the fetishization of
"naturalness" and distrust of the mainstream scientific community evident among
many alternative food advocates is the same wellspring from which opposition to
public health priorities like vaccination, water fluoridation, and sunscreen use also
flows. 7

2 See

Lindsay F. Wiley, The U.S. Department ofAgriculture as a Public Health Agency? A "Health in

All Policies" Case Study, 9 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 61 (2013) (describing: (1) the emergence of coalitions
among public health and environmental advocates, as well as among fruit and vegetable growers, during
2008 and 2012 Farm Bill negotiations; (2) the resulting gains for specialty crop subsidies; and (3) the
significant, but ultimately inadequate, reform of commodity crop subsidies); Dan Charles, How 'Double
Bucks'

for

Food

Stamps

Conquered

Capitol Hill,

NPR

(Nov.

10,

2014,

3:01

PM),

http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2014/11/10/361803607/how-double-bucks-for-food-stamps-conqueredcapitol-hill (describing the convergence of local health departments, agricultural interests, and anti-poverty
groups on interventions to increase the value of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits when
used to buy fruits and vegetables from local growers).
Rachel Slocum, Whiteness, Space and Alternative Food Practice, 38 GEOFORUM 520, 522 (2007)

("[A]lternative food practices ... advocate more ecologically sound and socially just farming methods, food
marketing and distribution, and healthier food options across the US.").
4

Christy Bridge, Another Weekend . . . in the Gym #23, BLOGGER (Aug. 18, 2014 8:30AM),

http://www.dinnerstories.co.uk/2014/08/another-weekend-in-gym-23.html

(see image 1 within the blog

post); see also Dotty Hagmier, Should We Be Counting Calories or Chemicals? MOMS IN CHARGE BLOG

(Mar. 1, 2014), http://momsincharge.org/blog/should-we-be-counting-calories-or-chemicals (explaining that
focusing on calorie counting is misleading, as chemical ingredients are a bigger problem for a healthy diet);
Kayce Johnson, Stop Counting Calories and Start Counting Chemicals, ORGANIC FITNESS FACTORY (Mar.

24,
2014),
http://www.organicfitnessfactory.com/#! STOP-COUNTING-CALORIES-AND-STARTCOUNTING-CHEMICALS-/clc9f/F8C10F68-ECCA-49CE-9057-32E4E20D6737 (suggesting that if there
are ingredients that "your grandmother would not have used in her kitchen" in a given food product, then the
body will not be able to break the substance down); Christina Sarich, Why You Should Stop Counting
Calories and Start Counting Chemicals, NAT.SOC'Y

(July 16, 2014), http://naturalsociety.com/stop-

counting-calories-start-counting-chemicals/ (arguing that chemicals such as heavy metals, BPA, aspartame,
and phthalates, among others, turn the endocrine system into "a mosh pit at a car crash competition").
See Bridge, supra note 4; Hagmier, supranote 4; Johnson supra note 4; Sarich, supra note 4.
6 See Mario Moretto, New Bill to Deregulate Small-Scale Raw Milk Producers Will Go to Maine
Legislature, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Mar. 6, 2014, 6:42 PM), http://bangordailynews.com/
2014/0 3/06/politic s/new-bill-to -deregulate -small-scale -raw-milk-producers-will-go -to -maine-legislature/.
Nancy Shute, HalfofAmericans Believe in Medical Conspiracy Theories, NPR (Mar. 19, 2014, 3:25

PM),

http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2014/03/19/291405689/half-of-americans-believe-in-medical-
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This article argues that foundational legal issues, including preemption of state
and local authority to protect the public's health and welfare, increasing First
Amendment protection for commercial speech, and eroding judicial deference to
legislative policy judgments, present a more promising avenue for collaboration
among food reform advocates than discrete priorities around issues like sugary drinks,
genetic modification, or organics. In Part II, I describe four recent cases in which
industry groups have challenged the authority of state and local governments to
regulate the food system: Grocery Manufacturers Ass'n v. Sorrell (challenging
Vermont's disclosure mandate and advertising restrictions for packaged GM foods);
Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Kauai9 (striking down Kauai's reporting requirement for GM
crop cultivation and buffer zone regulation for high-dose pesticide application); New
York. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. New York City
Department of Health & Mental Hygienelo (striking down New York City's portion
cap rule for sugary drinks sold in food service establishments); and City of Cleveland
v. State" (striking down a state law broadly preempting local government authority to
ban trans fats and regulate food service establishments in other ways). In Part III, I
draw on these case studies to discuss the foundational legal challenges faced by
diverse food reformers, even when their discrete reform priorities diverge. I urge a
collaborative response to the deregulatory toolkit being used by the food, beverage,
and agriculture industries. I conclude in Part IV by exploring the broader implications
of cooperation among groups with divergent perspectives on the mainstream scientific
community for notions of democratic governance. Environmental and public health
experts respond differently to the "irrationalities" (from the public health perspective)
or "values" (from the environmental perspective) that permeate public risk
perception. 12 1 suggest that each of these perspectives adds to our understanding of
democratic governance in the face of scientific uncertainty and that greater discourse
between the two could have benefits for both.
II. FOUR RECENT CASES
Our food system is hotly contested territory. In the midst of widespread concern
about obesity-related disease and toxic exposures, manufacturers have flooded the
market with products touted as "natural," "organic," and "GMO-free," including many
that are high in sugar, salt, and fat. Consumers are demanding more information about
the food and beverage products they buy and the ways in which they are produced.13
At a time when federal regulation to protect the public's health, consumers, and the
environment has been stymied by legislative inaction and constraints on agency
rulemaking, state and local governments have taken on a high-profile role in
"regulating to the detriment of politically powerful industries and their allies for the

conspiracy-theories (explaining that there are "common medical conspiracy theories," revolving around
vaccination, water fluoridation, and sunscreen use, among others).
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-CV117 (D. Vt. filed June 12, 2014).
9 Order on Preemption and Order on Various Motions at 36-38, Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Cnty. of Kauai,
No. 1:14-CV-00014-BMK (D. Haw. Aug. 23, 2014), 2014 WL 4216022.
1o N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health & Mental
Hygiene (N.Y. Statewide Coal. Ill), 16 N.E.3d 538, 541 (N.Y. 2014).
City of Cleveland v. State (Cleveland), 989 N.E.2d 1072, 1075 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013).
12 See infra Part IV.
1 See infra note 22 and accompanying text (analyzing the polling results of the American public's
opinion on GM foods).

287

DEREGULATION, DISTRUST, AND DEMOCRACY

purpose of conferring diffuse benefits on the public."14 City, county, and state
governments have become crucial innovators, particularly in areas such as tobacco
control, obesity prevention, Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs), and pesticide
use. Industry groups are responding with increasingly sophisticated litigation and
legislation strategies, using the First Amendment, Due Process, Equal Protection,
federalism, and separation of powers constraints to challenge and preempt food system
regulations. In this Part, I introduce four recent cases that illustrate the complexity of
these issues.
A. VERMONT'S GMO DISCLOSURE MANDATE AND ADVERTISING RESTRICTIONS:
GROCERYMANUFACTURERSASSOCIAITION V. SORRELL

A little more than forty years after the discovery of recombinant DNA1 5 and
twenty years after the U.S. Food and Drug Association (FDA) first approved an
additive used to produce GM foods,16 GM crops and foods are now ubiquitous. About
70-80% of foods purchased for home consumption and sold in restaurants contain at
least one GM ingredient.17 About half of U.S. cropland was seeded with GM crops in
2013, including 93% of soybean acreage and 90% of corn acreage. 8 In spite of, or
perhaps because of, the dominant presence of GM products in our food system and
repeated assurances from federal agencies that they are safe, the majority of Americans
express concern about their safety and environmental impacts. 19 In surveys, consumers
20
overwhelmingly favor mandatory labeling of GM foods, though statewide ballot
measures in California, Washington, Colorado, and Oregon have been unsuccessful.21

14 Paul A. Diller, Local HealthAgencies, the Bloomberg Soda Rule, and the Ghost of Woodrow Wilson,
40 FORDHAM URB. L.J., 1859, 1867 (2013); see also Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public
Health? ImplicationsofScale and Structure, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1219 (2014) (explaining the public health

and policy reasons driving local governments across the United States to heavily regulate tobacco and food
industries).
" David A. Jackson et al., Biochemical Method for Inserting New Genetic Information into DNA of
Simian Virus 40: Circular SV40 DNA Molecules Containing Lambda Phage Genes and the Galactose
Operon ofEscherichiacoli, 69 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ScI. U.S. 2904, 2904 (1972).
16 FDA Food Additives Permitted in Feed and Drinking Water of Animals, 21 C.F.R. § 573.130 (1994)
(prescribing conditions under which aminoglycoside 3-phosphotransferase II may be safely used as a food
additive for the development of genetically modified cotton, oilseed rape, and tomatoes).
17

Grocery

Manufacturers Association

Position

on

GMOs,

FACTS

ABOUT

GMOS,

http://factsaboutgmos.org/disclosure-statement (last visited Apr. 20, 2015) (explaining that if a food contains
corn or soy, it most likely contains genetically modified ingredients).
" JORGE FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS IN

THE UNITED STATES 9 (2014), http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/1282246/errl62.pdf.
19 See William K. Hallman et al., Public Perceptions of Labeling Genetically Modified Foods 5

(Rutgers Sch. of Envtl. & Bio. Sci., Working Paper No. 2013-01, 2013), available at
humeco.rutgers.edu/documentsjpdf/news/gmlabelingperceptions.pdf (finding that most Americans have
negative feelings about GM foods, with only 45% of Americans agreeing that GMOs are safe to eat); Gary
Langer,

Poll:

Skepticism

of

Genetically Modified Foods,

ABCNEwS,

http://abcnews.go.com/

Technology/story?id=97567 (concluding that the majority of Americans are skeptical about GM foods, with
52% believing GM foods are unsafe and 13% unsure about the safety of GM foods) (last visited Apr. 20,
2015).
20

Allison

Kopicki, Strong Support for Labeling Modified Foods, N.Y.

TIMES

(July

27,

2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/28/science/strong-support-for-labeling-modified-foods.html?_r-O
(indicating that 93% of Americans support labeling foods containing GMOs); see also U.S. Polls on GE
Food Labeling, CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/issues/976/ge-foodlabeling/us-polls-on-ge-food-labeling# (last visited Apr. 20, 2015) (citing multiple polls that show support
for mandatory labeling, ranging from 93% to 96%).
21 Nathanael Johnson, GMO Labeling Laws Keep Failing: Here's Why We Can Expect More, GRIST

(Nov. 6, 2014), http://grist.org/food/gmo-labeling-laws-keep-failing-heres-why-we-can-expect-more/.

288

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE

Proponents of genetic modification argue that GM products (ranging from bacteria
that break up spilled oil to treatments for diabetes and malaria to high-beta-carotene
rice that prevents nutrient deficiencies) have given scientists and policymakers new
tools for feeding people, saving lives, and protecting the environment.22 Critics express
concerns about health, environmental, and economic impacts. GM foods can introduce
new allergens into the food system.23 GM crops may reduce growers' use of highly
toxic herbicides in the short run (by increasing the effectiveness of less toxic
alternatives like glyphosate), but in the long run they may simply speed up the
development of weeds' resistance to less toxic herbicides.24 Reliance on GM crops
reduces biodiversity. 2 5 GM seeds contaminate non-GM crops, 26 causing economic
harm to growers who wish to certify their products as GM-free. 27 The market
dominance of GM seeds increases growers' economic dependence on a small number
of seed manufacturers.28 More serious health concerns-ranging from birth defects, to
liver failure, to a wide range of cancers-have been raised by GM critics, but are not
supported by reputable scientific sources. 29
Commonly

22

Asked

Questions

About

the

Food

Safety

of

GMOs,

MONSANTO,

http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/pages/food-safety.aspx#q6 (last visited Apr. 20, 2015) (explaining
that GM crops can improve the nutritional value of the crops and also increase crop yields, which in turn
allows farmers to use less resources and pesticides).
23

Questions & Answers on Foodfrom Genetically Engineered Plants, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,

http://www.fda.gov/food/foodscienceresearch/biotechnology/ucm346030.htm (last updated July 22, 2014)
(recognizing that there is a potential for allergens in GM foods and manufacturers are to evaluate whether
any new material may potentially cause allergic reactions).
24

FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO ET AL., supra note 18, at 24-25 (describing how the benefits of herbicide-

resistant GM crops are offset by glyphosate resistance).
25 Id. at 29 (highlighting how reduced diversity in weed management practices contributes to
glyphosate resistance).
26

Christopher Doering, GMO Wheat Issue Intensifies, GREAT FALLS TRIB. (Oct. 26, 2014, 10:05 PM),

http://www.greatfallstribune.com/story/news/local/2014/10/27/gmo-wheat-issue-intensifies/17985699/
(reporting the discovery of an unapproved type of GM wheat on a research field over ten years after the crop
had been planted there).
27 See Miles McEvoy, Organic 101: Can GMOs Be Used in Organic Products?, U.S. DEP'T AGRIC.

(May 17, 2013, 1:20 PM), http://blogs.usda.gov/2013/05/17/organic-101-can-gmos-be-used-in-organicproducts/ (detailing how cross-pollination from GM crops can contaminate non-GM crops and how the
standards for organic farming do not permit the use of GMOs).
28 Robert Langreth & Matthew Herper, The Planet Versus Monsanto, FORBES (Dec. 31, 2009, 4:40
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/011 8/americas-best-company-10-gmos-dupont-planet-versusmonsanto.html (describing the antitrust concerns surrounding Monsanto, which cripples smaller seed
companies due to its high market share).
29 For example, the Institute for Responsible Technology, the self-proclaimed "most comprehensive
source of GMO health risk information on the web," features a series of links to health studies to support
assertions

of

harm

from

GMOs.

GMO

Dangers,

INST.

FOR

RESPONSIBLE

TECH.,

http://www.responsibletechnology.org/gmo-dangers (last visited Apr. 20, 2015)._Among these assertions are
that GM corn damages the liver and kidney and that GM soy causes sterility. The claim that GM corn causes
kidney and liver toxicity is supported by a ninety-day rat feeding study which has been criticized by the
European Food Safety Authority's Scientific Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms for many statistical
flaws, ultimately the Panel concluded that the claims in the paper were not supported by the data. See id.;
Joel Spiroux de Vend~mois et al., A Comparison of the Effects of Three GM Corn Varieties on Mammalian
Health, 5 INT. J. Blo. SCI. 706 (2009); EUROPEAN FOOD SAFETY AUTH., Minutes of the 55th Plenary
Meeting ofthe Scientific Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms Held on 27-28 January2010 in Parma,

Italy 8 (Mar. 10, 2010), available at www.efsa.europa.eu/en/events/event/gmolOO127-m.pdf. A similar
study was subsequently retracted from the Food and Chemical Toxicology Journal due to the authors'
definitive conclusions despite a small sample size and failure to exclude the high incidence of tumors in the
Sprague-Dawley rat. See Retraction Notice to Long Term Toxicity of a Roundup Herbicide and a RoundupTolerant GeneticallyModified Maize, 63 FOOD & CHEM. TOXICOLOGY 244 (2014); MICHAEL ANTONIOU ET
AL., GLS BANK, GM Soy: SUSTAINABLE? RESPONSIBLE? 12 (2010) (articulating the risks of GM soy,

including a multigenerational feeding study on hamsters which lost the ability to reproduce by the third
generation). Cf BRUCE CHASSY & GRAHAM BROOKES, ACADEMICS REVIEW, A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF
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There is no federal statute specific to GMOs.3 0 Pursuant to the Coordinated
31
Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, which emphasizes that "regulatory
oversight should focus on the characteristics and risks of the biotechnology productnot the process by which it is created,"32 federal agencies treat GM foods as equivalent
to foods developed using traditional cross-breeding techniques. 33 GMO producers are
subject to generally applicable health, safety, and environmental statutes.3 4 The FDA
has provided nonbinding guidance on voluntary labeling of GM foods,3 5 but has not
imposed restrictions on genetic modification in food production.36 The U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS) regulates planting and interstate transportation of GMOs that pose a plant
pest risk.37 The U.S. Environmental Protection Administration (EPA) regulates GM
plants that produce substances intended to control pests (called plant-incorporated

THE

PAPER

'GM

Soy:

SUSTAINABLE?

RESPONSIBLE?'

(2012),

http://academicsreview.org/wp-

content/uploads/2013/08/GB-critiqueofpaperGM-soy-sustainable-july4-2012-version-2.pdf
(criticizing the
claims made in the Antoniou paper for, among other things, not being based on observed harmful health
effects).
30 Federal GMO labeling legislation has been introduced, most recently in 2013. See Genetically
Engineered Food Right-to-Know Act, S. 809, 113th Cong. (2013). At the same time, legislation was
introduced to preempt state and local GM labeling laws. See Safe and Accurate Food Labeling Act of 2014,
H.R. 4432, 113th Cong. (2014).
" Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology: Announcement of Policy Notice for
Public Comment, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (June 26, 1986).
32 Exercise of Federal Oversight Within Scope of Statutory Authority: Planned Introductions of
Biotechnology Products into the Environment, 57 Fed. Reg. 6753, 6756 (Feb. 27, 1992) (elaborating upon
the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology).
" See Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 22,984
(May 29, 1992) (explaining that the FDA will regulate production of food "derived from plant varieties
developed by the new methods of genetic modification" using the same approach as that "applied to foods
developed by traditional plant breeding").
3 See id.

&

* The Draft Guidance has indicated that labels about the presence or absence of GM ingredients need
to be truthful and not misleading. For example, a precise label statement such as "[w]e do not use
ingredients that were produced using biotechnology," should be used rather than "GMO free." U.S. FOOD
DRUG

ADMIN., DOCKET

NO. 00D-1598,

DRAFT

GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:

VOLUNTARY

LABELING

INDICATING WHETHER FOODS HAVE OR HAVE NOT BEEN DEVELOPED USING BIOENGINEERING

(2001),

available

at

http://www.fda.gov/food/guidanceregulation/guidancedocumentsregulatoryinformation/labelingnutrition/uc
m059098.htm.
36 See Douglas
A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the
Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REv. 526, 559-60 (2004) ("[T]he FDA arguably has

discretion to require thorough premarket review of GM food products under the [Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act's] grant of authority to regulate 'adulterated foods' and 'food additives.' In practice, however, the FDA
has conferred a 'generally recognized as safe' (GRAS) exemption from premarket review on any GM food
crop deemed substantially equivalent to its traditionally bred parental strain."); Statement of Policy: Foods
Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984 (May 29, 1992). FDA encourages developers of
new plant varieties for food use to consult with the agency, and makes completed consultation letters
publically available. Consultation Procedures Under FDA's 1992 Statement of Policy - Foods Derived
from
New
Plant Varieties,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Food/

GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatorylnformation/Biotechnology/ucm096126.htm

(last

visited Apr. 20, 2015); Biotechnology Consultations on Foodfrom GE Plant Varieties, U.S. FOOD & DRUG

ADMIN., http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/fcn/fcn Navigation.cfm?rpt=bioListing (last visited Apr. 20,
2015).
" See 7 C.F.R. § 340.1 (2013) (defining "Regulated Articles" to include any organism altered through
genetic engineering if the organism also meets the definition of "plant pest"); id. § 340.4 (2013) (delineating
the steps that must be taken to release into the environment or move an article regulated under this
authority).
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38
protectants) for environmental safety and safety for use in food. The EPA also
regulates GM microorganisms under the Toxic Substances Control Act.3 9 Additionally,
agencies taking certain actions with regard to GMOs may be required to prepare
Environmental Assessments or Environmental Impact Statements under the National
Environmental Policy Act.40
Frustrated by the lack of more rigorous regulation of GMOs and the GM
production process at the federal level, several state and local governments have
stepped in. 1 In May 2014, Vermont became the first state to enact a GM foods
42
labeling mandate. Citing "multiple health, personal, religious, and environmental
43
reasons," Act 120 would require GM foods 44 to be labeled as "produced with genetic
engineering," "'partially produced with genetic engineering," or "may be produced
with genetic engineering." 4 5 It would also prohibit such foods from being marketed
using the words "natural," "'naturally made," "naturally grown," "'all natural" or "any

3
See 40 C.F.R. § 174.1 (2014) (distinguishing plant-incorporated protectants from traditional
chemical pesticides); id. § 174.21 (exempting plant-incorporated protectants from certain requirements of
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act and the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).
39 15 U.S.C. § 2603 (2012) (empowering the EPA to determine whether a chemical would pose an
unreasonable risk to human health or the environment); 40 C.F.R. § 725.1 (establishing reporting
requirements for microorganisms, among other things, under the Toxic Substances Control Act).
40 See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-70h (2012) (establishing procedural requirements for submitting
environmental assessments and environmental impact statements for federal actions or projects); Ctr. for
Food Safety v. Vilsack, 734 F. Supp. 2d 948, 950, 955 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (vacating a decision by USDA to
deregulate GM sugar beets due to a failure by the agency to submit an environmental impact statement under
the National Environmental Policy Act).
4 The legislative findings in Vermont's GM labeling act state:
Because both the FDA and the U.S. Congress do not require the labeling of food
produced with genetic engineering, the State should require food produced with genetic
engineering to be labeled as such in order to serve the interests of the State,
notwithstanding limited exceptions, to prevent inadvertent consumer deception, prevent
potential risks to human health, protect religious practices, and protect the environment.

Act of May 8, 2014, No. 120, § 1(6), 2014 Vt. Acts & Resolves 348.
42 Maine and Connecticut enacted earlier GM food labeling laws, but
both of these laws include
"trigger" provisions, which prevent them from going into effect until other jurisdictions have adopted similar
provisions. James J. Gormley, GMO-Labeling Laws: Why the Trigger Clause?, NUTRITIONAL OUTLOOK

(Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.nutritionaloutlook.com/article/gmo-labeling-laws-why-trigger-clause-5-20147.
43 § 1(5), 2014 Vt. Acts & Resolves at 347. The legislative findings subsection references "conflicting
studies assessing the health consequences of food produced from genetic engineering," "genetic
homogeneity, loss of biodiversity, and increased vulnerability of crops to pests, diseases, and variable
climate conditions," and cross-pollination, leading to contamination of organic crops by GM crops and
displacement of native plants and fauna. Id. § 1(4).
44 Act 120 defines "food" as "food intended for human consumption," and defines "genetic
engineering" as "a process by which a food is produced from an organism or organisms in which the genetic
material has been changed through the application of: (A) in vitro nucleic acid techniques, including
recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) techniques and the direct injection of nucleic acid into cells or
organelles; or (B) fusion of cells (including protoplast fusion) or hybridization techniques that overcome
natural physiological, reproductive, or recombination barriers, where the donor cells or protoplasts do not
fall within the same taxonomic group, in a way that does not occur by natural multiplication or natural
recombination." Id. § 3042(3); id. § 3042(4).
45 Id. § 3043(a)-(b). The labeling mandate would not apply to: (1) animal products that are merely
produced with the use of GM animal feed; (2) products "grown, raised, or produced without the knowing or
intentional use of food or seed produced with genetic engineering"; (3) processed food that merely includes
processing aids or enzymes produced with genetic engineering; (4) alcoholic beverages; (5) processed food
in which GM ingredients account for no more than 0.9% of the total weight of the processed food; (6) food
not packaged for retail sale (including restaurant food and other foods prepared for immediate consumption);
and (7) medical foods regulated as such by the FDA. Id. § 3044.
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words of similar import that would have a tendency to mislead a consumer."46
Violation of either provision would be punishable by civil fines of up to $1000 per
product, per day. Act 120 authorizes the Attorney General to adopt rules requiring
that mandated labels "include a disclaimer that the Food and Drug Administration does
not consider foods produced from genetic engineering to be materially different from
other foods" and to harmonize Vermont's labeling requirements with those adopted by
other jurisdictions.
In June 2014, the National Association of Manufacturers, the International Dairy
Foods Association, the Snack Food Association, and the Grocery Manufacturers
Association filed a complaint in federal court alleging that Act 120: (1) violates their
First Amendment right "to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all";49
(2) violates the Fifth Amendment's requirement that "state laws define prohibited
conduct with sufficient specificity" so as to afford regulated entities "reasonable
notice" and avoid subjecting them to "arbitrary enforcement of the laws";5o (3) violates
the Commerce Clause's implied prohibition on state regulation of interstate
commerce; 51 and (4) is expressly or impliedly preempted by the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA), the
Federal Meat Inspection Act, and the Poultry Products Inspection Act.52
As of this writing, the case was pending in the federal district court, with industry
groups, food reform advocates, and other state and local governments watching it
closely. GMO labeling legislation has been introduced in more than twenty
jurisdictions, including via voter referendum.5 3 Commentators have suggested that
labeling laws represent the best solution to the debate over the potential health risks of
GM foods and have argued that state and local labeling laws should be upheld in the
face of constitutional challenges.
46 Id. § 3043(c); see also Proposed Consumer Protection Rule 121, Labeling
Foods Produced with
Genetic Engineering, at § 1.12 (defining "natural or any words of similar import" to mean nature, natural, or

naturally).

Id. § 121.04(e).
Id. § 3.
49 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 13, Grocery Mfrs. Ass'nv. Sorrell, No. 5:14-CV117 (D. Vt. June 12, 2014) (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)).
47

48

5

oId. at 17.
' Id. at 18-20.

52

"

Id. at 20-21.
See

CTR.

FOR FOOD

SAFETY,

GE FOOD

LABELING:

STATES

TAKE ACTION

1

(2014),

(discussing how in
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/ge-state-labeling-fact-sheet-92014_02919.pdf
the first half of 2014, thirty-five bills were introduced in twenty states regarding GM labeling).
54 Laura Murphy et al., More Than Curiosity: The ConstitutionalityofState LabelingRequirements for

GeneticallyEngineeredFoods, 38 VT. L. REV. 477, 480, 497-99 (2013) (concluding that state GMO labeling
laws should survive First Amendment challenges, particularly focusing on the Second Circuit's decision
regarding growth hormone labeling on milk). The authors state that Central Hudson is not the proper
standard for GMO disclosure requirements because courts have stated that it should only apply to state
disclosure requirements that are only supported by "consumer curiosity" interests. Id. at 507. Instead, the
Zauderer test should be applied because it "applies to mandated, factual disclosures and a broad set of
legitimate state interests." Id. at 522. Under Zauderer, a state would need to show: (1) its interest in
preventing consumer deception and protecting health; and (2) that the GMO disclosure is "reasonably
related" to that interest. Id. at 521. Once the state establishes this interest, courts should easily be able to find
that "labeling causes changes in human behavior" and conclude that the disclosure is reasonably related to
that interest. Id. (relying on a "common-sense" analysis); Matthew Rich, Note, The Debate over Genetically
Modified Crops in the United States: Reassessment of Notions of Harm, Difference, and Choice, 54 CASE

W. RES. L. REV. 889, 915 (2004) (discussing mandatory labeling laws for foods containing GMO
ingredients and concluding that these labels would not violate First Amendment interest and are the most
desirable regulatory solution to protect consumers). The author states that, while InternationalDairy Foods
Association v. Amestoy failed the second prong of the Central Hudson test, the case could have come out
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The Act 120 case may also have implications for ongoing fraud litigation in the
Northern District of California over the deceptive marketing of GM, organic, and
conventional foods using terms like "natural."55 Private parties have filed hundreds of
suits in the so-called "food court"56 alleging deceptive marketing by food and beverage
manufacturers and retailers. Many of the suits specifically target companies seeking to
capitalize on consumers' growing interest in "natural" products. For example, in Brazil
v. Dole Food Co., the plaintiffs claimed that some of the defendant's products
(including smoothies and fruit packaged in syrup) are improperly marketed as "all
natural," "'fresh," "'sugar-free," "'antioxidant," and "low calorie."5 7 In another case,
Gitson v. Trader Joe 's, the plaintiffs allege that the defendant uses the term
"evaporated cane juice" instead of "sugar" on products ranging from yogurt to
enchilada sauce to make them seem healthier.

B. KAUAI'S GM

CROP REPORTING
SYNGENTA SEEDS, INC. V. KAUAI

AND PESTICIDE BUFFER ZONE ORDINANCE:

Many of the concerns associated with GMOs focus on the production process,
rather than on consumption. The process of developing new GM seeds involves heavy
application of pesticides and herbicides. 5 9 Thousands of GM field trials have taken
60
place in the state of Hawaii, where growing conditions are good year-round.
Concerns about biodiversity loss, crop contamination, and exposure to pesticides and
herbicides have prompted local governments there to regulate GM producers.6 1
In November 2013, the Council of the County of Kauai adopted Ordinance 960,
which would require farms and agricultural companies to disclose the use of restricteduse pesticides or GMOs and create "pesticide buffer zones" to prohibit the use of
restricted-use pesticides within specified distances from homes, roadways, and bodies

differently had the state clearly stated its interest in protecting human and animal health. Id. at 905 (stating
that Judge Leval indicated this in the majority opinion which ultimately held that consumer curiosity was not
enough to sustain a mandatory disclosure on the label).
" See, e.g., Cox v. Gruma Corp., No. 12-CV-6502, 2013 WL 3828800, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. July 23,
2014) (dismissed with prejudice) (describing "all natural" claims on tortilla chips made from GMO com) ;
Kane v. Chobani, Inc., 973 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1124 (N.D. Ca. 2014) (alleging that Chobani cannot label
products made with added coloring as "all natural"). Manufacturers in these "natural" claim cases often
advance a First Amendment argument as a defense; however, these claims are largely unsuccessful due to
the application of the Zauderer standard for misleading commercial speech. Under Zauderer, the
government's interest in preventing consumer deception generally prevails over a manufacturer's speech,
when it can be demonstrated the speech is misleading.
56 See, e.g., Cox, 2013 WL 3828800, at *1-2 (describing "all natural" claims on tortilla chips made
from GMO com); Chobani, 973 F. Supp. 2d at 1124 ("all natural" claims regarding products made with
added coloring); Parkerv. J.M. Smucker Co., No. 13-0690, 2013 WL 4516156, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23,
2013) ("all natural" claims on vegetable oil products derived from GM crops and were heavily processed).
" Brazil v. Dole Food Co., 935 F. Supp. 2d 947, 966-67 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (granting defendants' motion
to dismiss without prejudice for a lack of sufficient particularity in the pleadings for claims subjected to the
heightened fraud pleading requirement).
5
Gitson v. Trader Joe's Co., No. 13-CV-01333, 2013 WL 5513711, at *10-11 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4,
2013) (dismissing with leave to amend claims for failure to plead fraud-based claims with sufficient
particularity and failing the reasonable consumer test under state law).
59 David Bronner, GMO Crops Accelerate Herbicide and Insecticide Use While Mainstream Media

Gets It Wrong, ECOWATCH (Sept. 29, 2014, 4:22 PM), http://ecowatch.com/2014/09/29/gmo-cropsaccelerate-herbicide-insecticide/.
60
Robynne
Boyd,
Genetically Modified
Hawaii,
SCi.
AM.
(Dec.
8,
2008),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/genetically-modified-hawaii/.
61 See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying
text.
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of water.6 The following month, the Council of the County of Hawai'i adopted an
ordinance prohibiting open-air cultivation, propagation, and development and testing
63
of GM crops.
While preemption legislation targeting these ordinances was pending in the state
64
legislature, four manufacturers of GMOs and pesticides brought suit against Kauai
County to invalidate Ordinance 960, alleging that it: (1) was preempted by the Hawaii
Pesticides Law, the Right to Farm Act, the State Planning Act, and the Agribusiness
65
Development Corporation statute, as well as the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act, the Plant Protection Act, and the FFDCA, which the plaintiffs
characterized as intentionally deregulatory;66 (2) violated the Due Process67 and Equal
Protection6 rights of the companies; and (3) represented a regulatory taking requiring
compensation.69 The complaint further alleged that the process by which the ordinance
was adopted was improper under the state's Open Meetings Law. 70 Four non-profit
organizations, including the Center for Food Safety and the Pesticide Action Network
of North America, intervened in support of the ordinance.
In Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. County of Kauai,72 a federal district judge struck down
Ordinance 960 on the ground that state agriculture laws (even in the absence of
amendments targeting the ordinance, which failed to pass in the state legislature)
vested regulatory authority over pesticides and potentially harmful plants with the
state's Board of Agriculture. 7 3 The County and intervener-defendant NGOs had argued
that the absence of explicit reference to county authority in the relevant state
agriculture laws indicated that the legislature did not intend for those laws to restrict
counties' broad authority to protect health, life, and property7 4 or their obligation to
protect public trust resources under the state constitution.7 5 In rejecting this argument,
62

KAUA'I, HAW., KAUA'I COUNTY

CODE 1987 ch. 22, art. 23 (uncodified at KAUA'I, HAW.,

ORDINANCE 960 (2014)). Kauai's mayor vetoed the bill, but the county council overturned the veto by a
vote of five to two.
63 HAWAI'I, HAW., HAWAI'I COUNTY CODE §§ 14-128-14-136 (2014).
This article of the county code
includes an exception for GM papayas, a grandfathering provision, and a provision allowing the county
council to grant emergency exceptions in cases where a "genetically engineered remedy" is the only
available solution to harm being caused by a plant pestilence. Id. § 14-132.
64 See infra Part
III.
65 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
at 35-36, Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Cnty. of Kauai,
No. 1:14-CV-00014 (D. Haw. filed Jan. 10, 2014), 2014 WL 120071.
66 Id. at 42-48.
67 Id. at 50-52.
61 Id. at 48-50.
69 Id. at 52-54.
7o Id. at 5, 64-66.
71 Order Granting Motion of Ka Makani Ho'opono et
al. to Intervene, Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Kauai,
No. 1:14-CV-00014 (D. Haw. Apr., 23, 2014), 2014 WL 1631830.
72 Sygenta Seeds, No. 1:14-CV-00014 (D. Haw. Aug. 25, 2014),
2014 WL 4216022.
7 See id. at *5-8.
74 The general police powers of Hawaiian counties are granted in HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-1.5(13)
(LexisNexis 2012), which provides:
Each county shall have the power to enact ordinances deemed necessary to protect
health, life, and property, and to preserve the order and security of the county and its
inhabitants on any subject or matter not inconsistent with, or tending to defeat, the intent of
any state statute where the statute does not disclose an express or implied intent that the
statute shall be exclusive or uniform throughout the State[.]
7 HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1 states:
For the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its political
subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawaii's natural beauty and all natural resources,
including land, water, air, minerals and energy sources, and shall promote the development
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the district court adopted Dillon's Rule to construe local government authority
narrowly76 and relied upon field preemption analysis.7 7 The court found that the
Ordinance was not preempted by federal law.7 "Having decided the case on preemption
grounds, the court refrained from adjudicating the plaintiffs' other constitutional
claims. 7 9 As of this writing, an appeal was pending in the Ninth Circuit. In November
2014, voters in Maui County approved a referendum that amends the county's charter
to impose a moratorium on cultivation of GMOs.so Suits were immediately filed by the
drafters of the initiative to ensure that the county enforces it and by Monsanto to
prevent implementation."1
C. NEW YORK CITY'S SUGARY DRINKS PORTION RULE: N.Y. STATEWIDE COALITION OF
HISPANIC CHAMBERS OF COlERCE v. N.Y C. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & MENTAL
HYGIENE
Dietary composition is the leading risk factor contributing to disease burden in the
United States.82 One-third of U.S. adults have high blood pressure and about 14% have
high cholesterol-both major risk factors for chronic disease.8 3 More than 8% of
Americans have been diagnosed with diabetes, with about half as many more
estimated to be living with undiagnosed diabetes." Nearly 40% of U.S. adults have
abnormal fasting glucose levels designating them as "pre-diabetic.", 5 Two-thirds of
adults and one-third of children have a body mass index above the healthy range, and
35% of adults, 20% of adolescents, 18% of 6-11 year olds, and 8% of 2-5 year olds are
obese.8 6
Until very recently, federal efforts in response to diet-related non-communicable
disease threats were largely confined to raising awareness and encouraging physician-

and utilization of these resources in a manner consistent with their conservation and in
furtherance of the self-sufficiency of the State. All public natural resources are held in trust
by the State for the benefit of the people.
76 Sygenta Seeds, No. 1:14-CV-00014, 2014 WL
4216022, at *8.
Id. at *8-9.
79

80

Id. at *9-14.
Id. at *14.
Maui County

Generically Modified

Organism

Moritorium

Initiative,

BALLOTPEDIA,

http://ballotpedia.org/Maui CountyGenetically_ModifiedOrganism Moratorium Initiative (November 2
014) (last visited Apr. 20, 2015); see also Maui, Haw., A Bill Placing a Moratorium on the Cultivation of
Genetically

Engineered

Organisms

(Nov.

4,

2014),

available

at

www.mauicounty.gov/

Archive/ViewFile/Item/19197 (implementing a temporary moratorium on all GM operations and practices
until an environmental public health impact statement can be completed through a public procedure by
independent, unbiased consultants).
8 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. Cnty. of Maui, No. 1400511-SOM-BMK (D. Haw. filed Nov. 13, 2014), 2015 WL 6240099.
82 See Christopher J. L. Murray, U.S. Burden of Disease Collaborators, The State of U.S. Health, 19902010: Burden ofDiseases, Injuries, andRisk Factors, 310 JAMA 591, 600 fig.3 (2013).
8
See MARGARET D. CARROLL ET. AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION [CDC],
NCHS DATA BRIEF: TOTAL AND HIGH-DENSITY LIPOPROTEIN CHOLESTEROL IN ADULTS 1 (2012), available

at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db92.pdf;
http://www.cdc.gov/bloodpressure/facts.htm.

High Blood Pressure Facts, CDC (Feb. 19, 2015),

84 High Blood Pressure Facts, CDC, supra note 83.
8

Alan S. Go, et al., Heart Disease and Stroke Statistics - 2014 Update, 128 CIRCULATION 1, 3

(2014).
86

Cynthia L. Ogden et al., Prevalence of Childhood and Adult Obesity in the United States, 2011-

2012, 311 JAMA 806 (2014).
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patient counseling. 7 After decades of minimal federal action to promote healthy
eating,"" in 2009 Congress enacted The Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act (HHFKA)
directing the USDA to establish more stringent nutrition standards for school meal
programs and other foods available in participating schools.89 Meanwhile, USDA
reformed its nutrition assistance program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC)
with health and nutrition goals in mind. 90 By mid-2010, however, the political climate
had shifted. A new federal tax on sugar-sweetened beverages was proposed as part of
the Affordable Care Act (ACA), but the proposal was dropped after lobbying from the
beverage industry. 91 In the intervening years, the 2009 school food reforms have come
under attack in Congress,92 and a calorie labeling rule for chain restaurant menus
promulgated by the FDA pursuant to an ACA directive has languished amidst repeated
delays attributed to lobbying by grocery stores, convenience stores, and pizza chains
for exemptions and weaker penalties. 93 Meanwhile, federal regulators have continued
to ignore commentators' calls for restrictions on food and beverage advertising,
instead deferring to industry self-regulation. 94
Dismayed by the weak and ineffective federal response, several state and local
governments have stepped into the fray, with New York City in the vanguard. New
York City pioneered the first program to increase the value of Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP, better known as "food stamps") benefits when used to
purchase fresh fruits and vegetables at farmers' markets in 2005;95 it was the first
87

See Lindsay F. Wiley, Shame, Blame, and the Emerging Law of Obesity Control, 47 U.C. DAVIS L.

REV. 121, 142-44 (2013) (describing the dominance of the behavioral model for promoting healthy eating
and physical activity through the late 1990s).
Healthy People 2010, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Service's ten-year public health
plan developed in 2000, included objectives aimed at expanding weight management programs offered
through employers, encouraging medical weight loss counseling by primary care providers, reducing sources
of unnecessary calories in school and restaurant meals, increasing nutrition labeling for food items, and
improving access to community recreational facilities. But "[c]ompared to the tobacco objectives, the ...
obesity objectives focus[ed] on results rather than publicly-directed strategies for obtaining those results.
There [were] no calls for state legislation, for example. While the report recognize[d] the growing
importance of childhood obesity, governmental entities . . . [were] not given any special responsibility to
protect children from risky foods." Mary Anne Bobinski, Health Disparities and the Law: Wrongs in Search
ofa Right, 29 AM. JL. & MED. 363, 378 (2003).
89
90

Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010, 42 U.S.C. § 1779(b) (2012).
See VICTOR OLIVEIRA & ELIZABETH FRAzAO, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., THE WIC PROGRAM:

BACKGROUND, TRENDS, AND ECONOMIC ISSUES, 2009 EDITION iv-v (2009), http://www.ers.usda.gov/

media/159295/err73.pdf (indicating that the USDA was concerned about health risks such as childhood
obesity, and thus took steps such as changing food packages used in the WIC program in order to encourage
healthier behavior in program participants).
91 Tom Hamburger & Kim Geiger, Beverage Industry Douses Tax on Soft Drinks, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 7,

2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/07/nation/la-na-soda-tax7-2010feb07.
92 See Nicholas Confessore, Lunch Money, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2014, (Magazine), at 34 (discussing
lobbying efforts to soften USDA regulations and the likelihood that Republican control of Congress will
result in the HHFKA being "gutted").
93 See Mary Clair Jalonek, FDA HeadSays Menu Labeling 'Thorny' Issue, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar.

%

12,
2013
7:42
AM),
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/2013/FDA head says menu labeling
27thomy%27_issue/id-c52ffa6745004500bf79dl2e20bdd908; Kira Lerner, FDA Delays Menu Labeling
Until End of Year, LAw360 (Mar. 4, 2014 6:42 PM), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/515328/fda-delaysmenu-labeling-changes-until-end-of-year.
94 See, e.g., Lisa L. Sharma et al., The Food Industry and Self-Regulation: Standards to Promote
Success and to Avoid Public Health Failures, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 240 (2010) (describing and

evaluating food industry self-regulation).
95 RACHEL WINCH, NUTRITION INCENTIVES AT FARMERS' MARKET: BRINGING FRESH, HEALTHY,

LOCAL

FOODS

WITHIN

REACH

13

(2008),

http://www.farmlandinfo.org/sites/default/files/

ebt matchingprogramsrachel winch_1.pdf (describing the history of the New York City "Health Bucks"
program).
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jurisdiction to adopt a calorie labeling mandate for chain restaurant menus in 200696
and the first to ban artificial trans-saturated fats in restaurant food in 2008.97 And in
2012, it intended to be the first to regulate portion sizes for sugary drinks. 98 Flanked by
public health experts at a table stacked with extra-large soda cups and sugar cubes
(representing the huge amounts of added sugars they typically contain), Mayor
Bloomberg announced a new proposal to limit the size of the containers in which food
service establishments sell sugary drinks. 99 By the time the New York City Board of
Health (BOH) announced its intention to pass such a rule, industry-supported
opposition groups were already mobilizing. The ensuing public debate was fierce. 100
The Portion Rule provided that "[a] food service establishment may not sell, offer,
or provide a sugary drink in a cup or container that is able to contain more than 16
fluid ounces." 101 The choice of sixteen ounces was intended to balance health impacts
with economic considerations, as that size is widely available and familiar to
customers.102 The ordinance excluded retail stores and alcoholic beverages, because
the City does not have clear jurisdiction over them.103 The State Department of
Agriculture and Markets regulates New York City food retail stores (e.g., bodegas,
10
supermarkets),1 0 4 while the State Liquor Authority regulates alcoholic beverages.o
The Rule was challenged by the New York Statewide Association of Hispanic
Chambers of Commerce, the New York Korean-American Grocers Association, the
local unit of the Soft Drink and Brewery Workers Union, the National Association of
Theatre Owners of New York State, the American Beverage Association, and the
American Restaurant Association.106 Although intense public discourse focused on

96 N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health (NYSRA II), 556 F.3d 114, 120-22 (2d Cir. 2009)
(upholding the second version of the city's calorie labeling mandate in the face of preemption and
constitutional challenges after the first version was struck down).
97 See. N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 81.08 (2008).

98 See Michael M. Grynbaum, Health Panel Approves Restriction on Sale of Large Sugary Drinks,

N.Y. TEIES (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/14/nyregion/health-board-approvesbloombergs-soda-ban.html.
99 N.Y.C. Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene, Bd. of Health, Notice of Adoption of An Amendment
(§81.53) to Article 81 of the N.Y.C. Health Code, (2014) available at http://www.nyc.gov/
html/doh/downloads/pdf/notice/2012/notice-adoption-amend-article81.pdf.
100

See, e.g., Michael M. Grynbaum, New York Plans to Ban Sale ofBig Sizes ofSugary Drinks, N.Y.

TIES (May 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/nyregion/bloomberg-plans-a-ban-on-largesugared-drinks.html?pagewanted=all ('"The New York City health department's unhealthy obsession with
attacking soft drinks is again pushing them over the top,' the [New York City Beverage Association]
spokesman, Stefan Friedman, said. 'It's time for serious health professionals to move on and seek solutions
that are going to actually curb obesity. These zealous proposals just distract from the hard work that needs to
be

done

on

this

front.'");

News,

NEW

YORKERS

FOR

BEVERAGE

CHOICES,

http://nycbeveragechoices.com/news/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2015) (listing recent news articles regarding the
struggle over regulating beverage choices in New York).
101 Portion Cap Rule, N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE, tit. 24, § 81.53(b) (2012). It defined a sugary drink as:
non-alcoholic; sweetened with a caloric sweetener; containing more than twenty-five calories per eight fluid
ounces; and not containing more than fifty percent milk or milk substitute. Id. § 81.53(a)(1). Like other
restaurant health code provisions, the Portion Cap Rule would have been enforced via inspections and fines,
with a maximum penalty of $200 per inspection. Id. § 81.53(d).
102 See N.Y.C. Dep't of Health and Mental Hygiene, supra note 99 (specifying that sixteen ounces
would be the largest drink size allowed).
103 tit. 24, § 81.53(b).
104 See N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW art. 2 § 16 (McKinney 2004) (detailing the responsibility of
regulating the "production, transportation, storage, marketing and distribution of food" and ensuring against
the sale of "unwholesome food").
'0' See generally N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 17 (McKinney 2011).
1'0 See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health & Mental
Hygiene, No. 653584/12 (N.Y. Statewide Coal. 1) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013).
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matters of liberty and paternalism, the suit raised predominantly administrative law

questions. 107
In 2013, a state trial court judge invalidated the Rule, holding that the BOH had
exceeded its delegated authority.10s Although the BOH "has very broad powers under
the New York City Charter," the judge reasoned the legislative intent was to grant the
Board authority "to protect the citizens of the city by providing regulations that
prevent and protect against communicable, infectious, and pestilent diseases." 109 Later,
an intermediate appellate court reached the same result, but with a greater emphasis on
the need to construe the BOH's authority narrowly to avoid what would otherwise be
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.110
Ultimately, the New York Court of Appeals agreed that the Portion Rule exceeded
the scope of the BOH's authority: "By choosing among competing policy goals,
without any legislative delegation or guidance, the Board engaged in law-making and
thus infringed upon the legislative jurisdiction of the City Council." 1 The court
emphasized that '[a]n agency that adopts a regulation, such as the Portion Cap Rule or
an outright prohibition of sugary beverages, that interferes with commonplace daily
activities preferred by large numbers of people must necessarily wrestle with complex
value judgments concerning personal autonomy and economics. That is policymaking, not rule-making."1 1 2

D.

CLEVELAND'S TRANS FAT BAN: CLEVELAND V. OHIO

In 2010, Ohio enacted a preemption law (buried in a 5000-page budget measure)
giving the state's agriculture department "sole and exclusive authority . . . to regulate
the provision of food nutrition information and consumer incentive items at food
service operations."113 These provisions were aimed at prohibiting local governments
in Ohio from adopting calorie labeling mandates like New York City's and nutritional
guidelines for meals sold with kid-friendly incentive items (better known as a "Happy
Meal Ordinance") like those adopted by San Francisco and Santa Clara County.
The
Ohio preemption law also prohibited localities from enforcing food content bans and
addressing "food-based health disparities." 15 Just months earlier, the City of
Cleveland had banned artificial trans fats (an additive with no nutritional value linked
to heart disease and obesity) in prepared foods sold in the city.11 6
In City of Cleveland v. State, a state appellate court found the preemption statute
unconstitutional because it attempted to limit "municipal home-rule."1 1 7 Notably, the
court distinguished the nutrition preemption law from an earlier Ohio statute
preempting local firearm regulations, which was upheld by the Ohio Supreme Court in

107

Id. at 1.

108

Id. at 20.

Id. at 15.
See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Health & Mental
Hygiene (N.Y. Statewide Coal. II), 110 A.D.3d 1, 5 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (discussing the separation of
powers doctrine in relation the BOH's authority).
..NY Statewide Coal. III, 16 N.E.3d 538, 541 (N.Y. 2014).
112 Id. at 548.
113 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3717.53(B) (LexisNexis 2012).
114 See S. F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 18, § 471.2 (2010); SANTA CLARA, CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES
§ A18-352 (2010).
..OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3717.53(C)(3-4) (LexisNexis 2012).
116 CLEVELAND, OHIO, HEALTH CODE tit. 3 § 241.42 (2011).
117 Cleveland, 989 N.E.2d 1072, 1077 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013).
109
10
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2010,118 on the rationale that the firearms regulation was part of a "statewide and
comprehensive legislative enactment" whereas the "broad, flat ban by the General
Assembly prohibiting municipalities from exercising their police powers" with regard
to nutrition and food-based health disparities was not justified as part of
comprehensive legislation regulating restaurant food.1 19
The court noted that it was particularly concerned by the process by which the
preemption provision was added to the general appropriations bill:
In response to the city of Cleveland's trans-fats Ordinance, the Ohio
Restaurant Association (ORA) sent an email to the Ohio Department of
Agriculture with an attached legislative proposal. The email stated that
the Ordinance was "exactly what we want to preempt with the attached
amendment." The email also stated that the amendment was "a high
priority for Wendy's, McDonalds and YUM! [the operator-licensor of
Taco Bell, KFC and Pizza Hut]" According to the email, a senator had
already been given a copy of ORA's proposed legislation and would
offer it in the Senate Finance Committee. Thus, the amendments were
drafted on behalf of a special interest group with the specific purpose of
snuffing out the Ordinance.120
Such open acknowledgements by the courts of the role that industry lobbying
plays in curtailing local government authority are rare.
III. TENSIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES
As the case studies in Part II illustrate, food law and policy are deeply contentious.
Industry lobbying makes legislative and regulatory reforms difficult to adopt, and legal
challenges often block or delay implementation. These challenges make collaboration
among diverse groups with a shared interest in increasing equitable access to healthy,
sustainably produced food essential. Recent experiences suggest that opportunities for
cooperation on discrete food reform priorities may be limited to interventions aimed at
increasing consumption of fresh fruits and vegetables through taxation and spending
initiatives, without extending to other issues, like regulating GMOs, trans fats, and
sugary drinks. There may, however, be significant untapped potential for collaboration
on foundational legal issues like preemption, increasing First Amendment protection
for commercial speech, and the erosion of judicial deference to legislative policy
choices, which are all central to industry groups' deregulatory toolkit.
A. FOOD REFORM PRIORITIES
Many commentators point to the emerging food justice movement as having "the
potential to link different kinds of advocates, including those concerned with health,
the environment, food quality, globalization, workers' rights and working conditions,
access to fresh and affordable food, and more sustainable land use."121 Indeed, during
2002 Farm Bill negotiations, the "Eggplant Caucus" (made up of senators from states

See generally City of Cleveland v. State, 942 N.E.2d 370 (Ohio 2010) (upholding a less restrictive
statewide statute over a more restrictive city ordinance).
119 Cleveland, 989 N.E.2d at 1081-82.
120 Id. at 1085 (discussing a distinct challenge to the state preemption
law as violating an antilogrolling provision known as the "single subject rule").

121 ROBERT GOTTLIEB & ANUPAMA JOSHI, FOOD JUSTICE
5 (2010).
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that produce specialty crops like eggplantsl22 and senators from states where voters are
particularly interested in environmental conservation) pushed for fruit and vegetable
subsidies and conservation programs as part of a more balanced farm bill and
ultimately played an important role in the bill's passage.123 "The ink was barely dry on
the [2002 Farm Bill] when diverse interest groups began to form and ready themselves
for serious lobbying" in anticipation of negotiations surrounding [the 2008 Farm
Bill]. 12 In 2004, The Prevention Institute published Cultivating Common Ground:
Linking Health and Sustainable Agriculture, which identified opportunities and
strategies for cross-sector advocacy with an emphasis on healthy eating alongside
more traditional environmental health concerns like antibiotic resistance and
occupational hazards for farm workers.125 These efforts coincided with growing
awareness of obesity-related health problems, and experts across sectors began to link
the farm subsidies to environmental and public health concerns.126 Starting in 2005
with the New York City Health Department's pioneering program and culminating in
the 2014 Farm Bill's provision of $100 million for doubling SNAP benefit value for
the purchase of fresh fruits and vegetables, health, environmental, anti-poverty, and
local farming advocates have also combined forces to reform nutrition assistance
programs.127

The priorities of diverse food reform movements are not entirely synergistic,
however. From the start, the emphasis among organic growers and environmental
groups on the importance of organic farming methods has not been uniformly
supported by public health advocates, many of whom are concerned about the cost,
and therefore accessibility, of organic produce, as well as the growing number of
calorie-dense organic foods with low nutritional value. 12 As the Cultivating Common
Ground report noted, "even the organic food industry creates an ever-greater number
of chips, high-calorie beverages, instant meals, and other processed foods."129 As
industrial food producers co-opted the organic movement, activists began to reorganize themselves into a loose "alternative food" movement, which Michael Pollan

122 Nonperishable grain and oilseed commodity crops (e.g., wheat, corn, sorghum, barley, oats, cotton,
rice, and soybeans) enjoyed the most lucrative subsidies under the Farm Bill. 7 U.S.C. § 8713(b) (repealed
2014). Fruits and vegetables are considered "specialty crops" under existing law and do not receive the same

benefits as commodity crops. FreshFruit, Hold the Insulin, 306 SCI. AM. 12, 12 (2012).
123 See Editorial, The Eggplant Rebellion, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/
2001/11/12/opinion/the-eggplant-rebellion.html.
124

JOAN FLYNN, TOBACCO LAW CTR., THE UNITED STATES FARM BILL: AN INTRODUCTION FOR FRUIT

AND VEGETABLE ADVOCATES 2 (2008), http://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/phlc-

policy-farm-bill.pdf.
125

LARRY COHEN ET AL., PREVENTION INST., CULTIVATING COMMON GROUND: LINKING HEALTH AND

SUSTAINABLE

AGRICULTURE

3-4

(2004),

http://www.preventioninstitute.org/index.php?option=com

jlibrary&view=article&id=67&Itemid=127.
126 See FOOD & WATER WATCH, FARM BILL 101 1 (2012), http://documents.foodandwaterwatch.org/
doc/FarmBilll0lReport.pdf#_ga=1.257761867.1128068099.1425614380;
MARK
MULLER ET
AL.,
CONSIDERING THE CONTRIBUTION OF U.S. FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL POLICY TO THE OBESITY EPIDEMIC

(2007) (reporting on how United States food polices shape the type and quantity of food produced and
consumed in the United States as, which in turn contributes to the country's increasing trend of childhood
obesity); HEATHER SCHOONOVER, A FAIR FARM BILL FOR PUBLIC HEALTH (2007), http://www.iatp.org/
files/258_2_98598.pdf (outlining ways agricultural policy affects public health and proposing policy
solutions to support healthier food and sustainable farming); Member Announcements, HEALTHY FARMS
HEALTHY PEOPLE COALITION, http://hfhpcoalition.org/member-updates/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2015).
127 See generally Charles, supra note 2 (discussing initiatives inspired by New York City's

HealthBucks that are developing in other states); Winch, supra note 95 (surveying multiple case studies
outside of New York City with similar programs).
128 See COHEN ET AL., supra note 125, at 14-15.
129

Id. at 13.
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described as being "unified as yet by little more than the recognition that industrial
food production is in need of reform because its social/environmental/public
health/animal welfare/gastronomic costs are too high."130 Later, in response to
concerns that the alternative food movement is elitist,131 some groups seeking to
reform industrial food production evolved yet again to adopt a "food justice"
framework, which "focuses on the barriers that low-income or otherwise marginalized
groups face in realizing the goals of the broader food movement, such as access to
fresh, unprocessed food." 1 3 2
Equitable access to fresh, unprocessed food certainly is not bad for public health.
But it is not enough, either. Increasing fruit and vegetable consumption does not
counteract the harms associated with a high-calorie diet with lots of added sugars.
Public health advocates have adopted strategies that push consumers toward "better for
you" versions of the processed food and beverage products that dominate the
American diet. The New York City Portion Rule, for example, creates a price
differential that may push consumers toward "diet" and "zero calorie" sodas as an
alternative to high-calorie drinks with added sugars.133 Meanwhile, consumers'
preference for "natural" ingredients has led major beverage manufacturers to promote
"'cane sugar" sodas.134 High fructose corn syrup may be associated with some
additional health risks compared to cane sugar, but the "naturalness" of cane sugar (or
"'organic evaporated cane juice" for that matter) does not reduce its high calorie
content or its contribution to diabetes and heart disease.135 Commentators emphasized
that the Portion Rule would have applied equally to sodas and "natural" organic drinks
136
like Honest Tea, as if the failure to distinguish between the two was irrational.
Nevermind that Honest Tea is owned by Coca-Colal37 and the added sugars in its most

130 Michael Pollan, The Food Movement, Rising, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 10, 2010, at 31, 31 available
at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/20 10/jun/10/food-movement-rising/.
13

Rebecca L. Goldberg, No Such Thing as a Free Lunch: Paternalism,Poverty, and Food Justice, 24

STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 35, 49 (2013) ("[W]ith its focus on farmers' markets and a do-it-yourself avoidance
of processed food, many of the food movement's goals do seem aimed at those with disposable income and
disposable time.").
132

133

id.
See, e.g., Lisa Fickensher, Beverage Makers Sour on Sweetened-Drink Ban, CRAIN'S N.Y. BUS.

(June 3, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20120603/HOSPITALITYTOURISM/
306039976/beverage-makers-sour-on-sweetened-drink-ban (quoting a restaurant industry source as saying,
"[i]f the ban goes into effect, we'll sell a lot of beverages with synthetic sweeteners, and our water sales will
go up").
134 See Beverages, SUGAR Ass'N, http://www.sugar.org/sugar-based-products/beverages/
(last visited
Apr. 20, 2015) (listing several sugary drinks touting "all natural ingredients" and featuring cane sugar).
13'

Deborah Kotz, Study: Added Sugar Increases Risk of Dying from Heart Disease, BOSTON.COM

(Feb. 3, 2014, 7:22 PM), http://www.boston.com/lifestyle/health/blogs/daily-dose/2014/02/03/eating-toomuch-added-sugar-linked-higher-risk-dying-from-heart-disease/kzV5NHWJcfDCe4HadjDHhM/blog.html.
136 See Fickensher, supra note 133 ("Soda may be the biggest target of the ban, but sweetened teas are
also included. Honest Tea, for example, which is considered one of the healthier brands because of its low
sugar content and organic ingredients, would not be able to sell its top product, Honey Green Tea, in New
York City if the ban is passed" because it contains twenty more calories per 16.9 ounce bottle than would be
allowable under the Portion Cap Rule.); Lynne Kiesling, Bloomberg 's Bureacratic "Big Gulp" Rule, More
Unintended Costs, KNOWLEDGE PROBLEM (July 23, 2012), http://knowledgeproblem.com/2012/

07/23/bloombergs-bureaucratic-big-gulp-rule-more-unintended-costs/
(discussing the application of the
Portion Rule to Honest Tea's most popular product, Honey Green Tea, which contains thirty-five calories
per eight ounce serving and is bottled in containers larger than sixteen ounces, assuming that the regulation
would prompt the manufacturer to incur great expense to change the bottle size, rather than prompting a
formulation change to lower the calorie content to twenty-five calories per eight ounce serving so that it
would fall outside of the Portion Rule's definition of "sugary drinks").
13' Brands, COCA COLA, http://www.coca-colacompany.com/brands/honest-tea#TCCC
(last visited
Apr. 20, 2015).
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popular product qualify it as a "sugary drink" with more than twenty-five calories per
138
eight ounce serving.
Many public health advocates see the anti-GMO and pro-organics movements as
distractions from more pressing healthy eating priorities. Particularly in debates over
school food, nutrition experts like Margo Wootan express concern about alternative
food and food justice advocates' insistence on local, organic, GMO- and hormonefree, "natural" ingredients:
"You can have full-fat cheese from a local farmer, and it's still going to
clog your arteries and give you heart disease," she says. "Having the
food be natural is nice, but a bigger threat to children's health is making
sure that there's not too much salt and not too much saturated fat."
Banishing high-fructose corn syrup, Wootan says, is "a waste of time
and money" - better to limit children's total sugar intake. As for
hormone-free milk, she says, most milk is hormone-free. "And if it isn't,
it's not a health problem." 1 3 9
Wootan's organization, the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI), is a
driving force behind calorie and trans fat labeling regulations, food advertising
restrictions, nutritional standards for packaged foods and restaurant meals marketed to
children, and school food reform. 1 4 0 In addition to expressing skepticism about the
health benefits of organic food production and hormone-free dairy production, CSPI is
opposed to mandated labeling of GM foods.14 1 Citing the same concerns expressed by
the plaintiffs in Grocery Manufacturers, CSPI Biotechnology Director Gregory Jaffe
notes that GMO disclosure mandates could mislead consumers by "falsely imply [ing]
that food made without GE ingredients is safer or superior in some way."142 CSPI has,
however, urged federal regulators to rigorously guard against the environmental
impacts of GMO production.143 Similarly, the Healthy and Sustainable Food Program
at Harvard School of Public Health's Center for Health and the Global Environment
emphasizes environmental, rather than food safety, concerns, pointing out that GM
foods "hold great promise that they may provide one of the solutions to help feed
growing world populations. But there are also potentially large, and often not well

13

Kiesling, supra note 136.

Greg Toppo, Healthy, Organic, and Cheap School Lunches? Order Up, USA Today (Dec. 1, 2009,
7:53 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/2009-12-02-schoollunch02stN.htm
(quoting
Margo Wootan, Nutrition Policy Dir., Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest).
140 See Highlights from 40 Years of Accomplishments, CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST,
https://www.cspinet.org/about/accomplishments.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2015).
139

141 See Elaine Watson, CSPI: There Are Legitimate Concerns About GMOs, But Not Around Food

Safety, and Labeling Would Be Misleading, FOODNAVIGATOR-USA.CoM (July 4, 2013, 00:24 GMT),
http://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/People/CSPI-There-are-legitimate-concems-about-GMOs-but-notaround-food-safety-and-labeling-would-be-misleading (quoting Gregory Jaffe, Dir. of Biotech., Ctr. for Sci.
in the Pub. Interest).
142 id.
143 See, e.g., Letter from Gregory Jaffe, Dir. of the Biotech. Project, Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest, to
U.S. Dep't of Agric. (Mar. 11, 2014), available at http://cspinet.org/biotech/Greg-Jaffe-CSPI-2-4-DComment-USDA-3-11-14.pdf (urging USDA to use its authority under the Plant Protection Act to manage
and address herbicide resistant weeds); Letter from Gregory Jaffe, Dir. of the Biotech. Project, Ctr. for Sci.
in the Pub. Interest, to Thomas Vilsack, Sec'y of Agric., U.S. Dep't of Agric. (Mar. 20, 2013), available at
http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/coexistence-letter-to-usda-march-20.pdf
(urging the USDA to take more
meaningful action to promote co-existence between conventional, organic, identity-preserved (non-GMO),
and GM crops, including by regulating GM seed producers and farmers to protect the interest of organic and
identity-preserved growers).
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understood, risks from GM technologies-to the environment in general, and to
biodiversity and the functioning of ecosystems in particular." 4
At its extreme, fetishization of naturalness prompts some alternative food
advocates to promote "food libertarianism," arguing against regulations mandating
pasteurization of dairy products and imposing food safety standards aimed at reducing
exposure to life-threatening food-borne infections. 1 45 Although they may personally
eschew mass-produced sugary beverages and packaged snack food products, some
alternative food advocates see public health-oriented soda taxes, bans on trans fats, and
portion caps as threatening the liberty to eat and drink whatever and however one
chooses.146 In a similar vein, some food justice advocates express deep skepticism
about government's role in ensuring equitable access to fresh produce. 1 They "prefer
to grow food on their own terms, without government involvement."
The fetishization of naturalness has other negative consequences for public health.
Ending vaccination, water fluoridation, and even sunscreen use are among the top
priorities of many "natural health" companies. For-profit purveyors of "natural health
products" like Mercolal49 and Natural News1so feature "news reports" touting
pseudoscientific studies on the benefits of natural eating and the ineffectiveness and
harmfulness of pharmaceuticals, vaccines, and conventional medical and dental care
while selling everything from nutritional supplements and protein powders to cupping
therapy kits and tanning beds.

B.

PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITY TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH
AND WELFARE

Leaving aside discrete food reform priorities, foundational legal issues like
preemption of state and local authority may offer untapped opportunities for
collaboration among public health, environmental, and food justice advocates. Local
governments and the states have long exercised primary responsibility for protecting
the public's health, safety, and welfare.1 5 1 At a time when federal health and
environmental measures face stiff opposition, pioneering state and local governments
144

Genetically Modified Foods, HARv. SCH. PUB. HEALTH,

http://www.chgeharvard.org/topic/

genetically-modified-foods (last visited Apr. 20, 2015).
145

See

Steve

Holt,

Food Activism's

Libertarian Streak,

TAKEPART

(May

22,

2012),

http://www.takepart.com/article/2012/05/22/food-activisms-libertarian-streak ("Libertarian sentiments run
throughout the food movement, from criticism of federal subsidies that unfairly favor certain commodities
over others, to bans on certain food, to a general distrust of the link between the federal government and
large food producers.").
146

Our Mission, KEEP FOOD LEGAL, http://www.keepfoodlegal.org/mission (last visited Apr. 20, 2015)

("[T]here are too many restrictions on our right to procure the foods we love, and ... these restrictions are
growing. At the local, state, and federal levels, elected officials and regulators have banned or are working to
ban or severely restrict everything from traditional farm products (like raw milk and cheeses) and locavorefriendly farm practices (like on-farm animal slaughter and meat packaging), are seeking to prevent chefs
from using common food ingredients (like salt, foie gras, and trans fats), and are looking to ban others from
selling a variety of foods (including soda, energy drinks, bacon-wrapped hot dogs, and giant pizza slices) or
even to share foods (with the homeless or with fellow consumers).").
147 Christopher J. Curran & Marc-Tizoc Gonzalez, Food Justice as Interracial
Justice: Urban Farmers,
Community Organizationsand the Role of Government in Oakland, California, 43 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.

REv. 207, 230-31 (2011).
Id. at 208.
MERCOLA.COM, http://www.mercola.com (last visited Apr. 20, 2015).
"'NAT. NEWS, http://www.naturalnews.com (last visited Apr. 20, 2015).
151
See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK
148
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http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1914-25045
1246/final national response framework_20130501.pdf.
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are stepping into the regulatory void. But their actions are subject to preemption, a fact
which affected industries routinely exploit as a crucial component of their deregulatory
strategy.
1. Federal Preemption
In 2014, Congressman Mike Pompeo of Kansas responded to calls for mandatory
labeling of GM foods by introducing federal legislation.152 The industry-backed bill
would have regulated the use of "GMO-free" labeling and prohibited state and local
governments from mandating labeling for GMO foods.153 This strategy-sponsoring a
bill with minimal regulatory impact and broad deregulatory impact-is common
among industry groups seeking to avoid state and local regulation.15 4
By authority of the Supremacy Clause, Congress may preempt state law, even if
the state is acting squarely within its police powers.1 5 5 Taking a page from the tobacco
industry,156 the food and beverage industry is using express and implied preemption to
powerful effect. For example, the initial version of New York City's restaurant menu
calorie labeling mandate was struck down on the grounds that it was preempted by the
federal Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA). 15 The Board of Health
then retooled the regulation, which survived a preemption challenge under the
NLEA. 15 Several other state and local governments quickly adopted New York's
approach. 1 5 9 Eventually, the restaurant industry, eager to trade the possibility of
conflicting regulations at the state and local level for uniform federal requirements was
willing to concede to a federal menu labeling law included in the Affordable Care Act,
which would preempt most state and local efforts.160 As noted above, the federal
provision is now tied up in implementation as industry groups fight for special

152 See Safe and Accurate Food Labeling Act of 2014, H.R. 4432, 113th
Cong. (2014) ("A bill to
amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act with respect to food produced from, containing, or
consisting of a bioengineered organism, the labeling of natural foods, and for other purposes.").
. Id. §§ 104, 425.

154 See Biotechnology State Uniformity Resolution Exposed, ALEC EXPOSED, http://alecexposed.org/

w/images/8/8b/3A3-BiotechnologyState Uniformity Resolution Exposed.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2015);
Seed Law Preemption Background: Industry Aims to Strip Local Control of Food Supply, ENvTL.

COMviONS, http://environmentalcommons.org/seedlawbackgrounder.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2015).
155 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S.
525, 540-41 (2001) (stating that Congress may
preempt state police power if there is express or implied language in the "congressional enactment"
authorizing congressional preemption or if there is "implication from the depth and breadth of a
congressional scheme that occupies the legislative field").
116 See e.g., id. (invalidating, on preemption grounds, a Massachusetts law aimed at preventing youth
exposure to cigarette advertising); Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (holding that some
state failure-to-warn and fraudulent misrepresentation claims are preempted); Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp.
Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364 (2008) (invalidating, on preemption grounds, a Maine law aimed at preventing youth
access to tobacco from the Internet and mail-order sales by requiring carriers to ensure that cigarettes were
delivered only to adults).
15. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health (NYSRA 1), 509 F.Supp. 2d 351, 361-63 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (holding that the 2006 version of the calorie labeling mandate, which required restaurants that had
voluntarily provided calorie information in some form to post that information on their menus, sought to
regulate nutrient content claims and was thus preempted by the NLEA).
158 NYSRA II, 556 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding the 2008 version of the calorie labeling mandate,
which applied to chain restaurants regardless of whether they voluntarily made calorie information available
in any form).
159 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 114094 (West 2012).
16o But see Andrew Martin, Inside the Powerful Lobby Fightingfor Your Right to Eat Pizza,

BLOOMBERG BUS. (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2015-03-03/junk-food-s-laststand-the-pizza-lobby-is-not-backing-down ("Other comers of the fast-food industry have folded against
public pressure for healthier choices. Not pizza. . .. ").
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treatment and some local governments fight for exemptions to the preemption
- - 161
provision.
The agriculture industry has had mixed results with federal preemption
challenges. In Syngenta Seeds, the federal district judge held that federal law did not
preempt the Kauai Ordinance.162 Similarly, in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences,163 the
Supreme Court held that state law claims for defective design, defective manufacture,
negligent testing, breach of express warranty, and violation of the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practice Act were not preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act. On the other hand, in National Meat Association v. Harris,164 the
Court held that the Federal Meat Inspection Act expressly preempted a California law
prohibiting the sale of meat or from nonambulatory "downer" animals for human
consumption as applied to federally inspected swine slaughterhouses.
2. State Preemption of Local Government Authority
Local government actions are vulnerable to preemption by the state legislature, as
well as federal preemption. As illustrated by the history of the Kauai Ordinance,
industry groups often respond to innovative local measures by challenging the local
law as preempted by existing state or federal law (and on other constitutional grounds)
while simultaneously introducing new legislation at the state level (including in states
where no local jurisdiction has expressed interest in following the vanguard) to clearly
preempt local authority to regulate.165
While it is undisputed that states have plenary authority to protect the health and
welfare of the populace (subject to constitutional restraints, including via the
Supremacy Clause), there is considerable disagreement over how much leeway should
be given to local governments to address similar concerns. The scope of local
government authority varies from state to state and is subject to judicial interpretation,
as illustrated by the district court's decision in Syngenta v. Kauaii. Constitutional and
statutory grants of authority to cities or counties determine the degree of autonomy, or
"home rule," over local affairs enjoyed by the local government.166 In the majority of
states, at least some local government entities are granted considerable home rule,
meaning that they have broad authority to regulate: for the protection of the public's
health, safety, welfare, and morals; to license; to tax; and to incur debt, subject only to
the limitations imposed by the state and federal constitutions.167 Local governments
that lack home rule perform the same basic functions, but their interventions must fall
within specific grants of authority from the state, limiting their ability to pioneer new
responses to pressing public problems.
As Cleveland v. Ohio illustrates, broad state preemption may run afoul of home
rule, at least for localities whose home rule authority is established in the state

161

See Dylan

166

See id. at 1124-27.

Scott, Philly Feuds with Feds over Calorie Counts on Menus, GOVERNING
(Mar. 20,
2013), www.goveming.com/blogs/fedwatch/gov-philly-feuds-with-feds-over-menu-labeling-rules.html.
162 Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. County of Kauai, Civ. No. 1:14-CV-00014-BMK,
2014 WL 4216022 at
*9-13 (D. Haw. Aug. 25, 2014).
16' Bates v. Dow Agrosci. LLC, 544 U.S.
431 (2005).
164 Nat'l Meat Ass'nv. Harris, 132 S.
Ct. 965 (2012).
161 See Paul Diller, IntrastatePreemption, 87 B.U. L. REv. 1113 (2007)
(analyzing city and state law
preemption schemes).

See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6 (granting broad authority to local governments to "exercise any
power and perform any function pertaining to . . . [local] government and affairs including . .. the power to
regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals, and welfare . . . .").
167
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constitution.168 Another example is the 2006 opinion from the Colorado Supreme
Court finding that the state's broad statute preempting firearms regulation
unconstitutionally infringed on Denver's home rule authority.169 The Court reinstated
the city's ordinance prohibiting the carrying of firearms in city parks. 170 State courts in
New York and Pennsylvania have recently rejected state preemption of local authority
to regulate the practice of hydraulic fracturing (a process by which natural gas is
extracted from shale at great depth below ground level).
On the other hand,
Syngenta v. Kauai illustrates judicial use of Dillon's Rule to construe statutory grants
of authority to local governments (including broadly drafted home rule grants 72) as
narrowly as possible.173
Public health advocates know state preemption battles all too well. The strict
construction of delegations to local governments was often used during the Sanitarian
movement of the nineteenth century to block public health measures that judges
regarded as unwarranted. 1 74 More recently, in the hard-fought battles to adopt and
implement anti-smoking regulations, preemptive legislation was typically introduced
at the state level shortly after the adoption, or even consideration, of the first local
ordinances banning smoking.1 75 In addition to the broad preemption law at issue in
City of Cleveland v. State, Florida, Arizona, and other states have also passed
preemption bills prohibiting local governments from regulating the use of toys and
other giveaways to promote unhealthy fast food meals to children.176
City of Cleveland v. State was an important victory for the public health authority
of local governments, but the same reasoning would not apply in many other states.
161

See Cleveland, 989 N.E.2d 1072 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013).

169

State v. City of Denver, 139 P.3d 635 (Colo. 2006).

170

id.

See John R. Nolon & Steven E. Gavin, Hydrofracking: State Preemption, Local Power, and
Cooperative Governance, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 995, 1013-26 (2013).
171

172 See, e.g., Midwest Emp'rs Council, Inc. v. City of
Omaha, 131 N.W.2d 609 (Neb. 1964) (holding,
inter alia, that Omaha's home rule charter did not fairly imply that the city had authority to enact an
ordinance prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of race, religious creed, color, national origin,
or ancestry because a home rule charter must be "construed strictly in favor of the public and against the
public officials of the charter city").
173 Home rule is sometimes mistakenly contrasted with "Dillon's Rule," but the two doctrines can and
do co-exist in the majority of states. Whereas home rule refers to the breadth or narrowness of the local
government's grant authority, Dillon's Rule is a judicial rule of construction. JESSE J. RICHARDSON, JR. ET

AL., BROOKINGS INST. CTR. ON URBAN AND METROPOLICY, IS HOME RULE THE ANSWER? CLARIFYING

THE INFLUENCE OF DILLON'S RULE ON GROWTH MANAGEMENT 3-4 (2003). Under Dillon's Rule, "a

municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others: first, those granted in
express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted;
third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation, not
simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable, doubt concerning the existence of the power is
resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power is denied." Clark v. City of Des Moines, 19
Iowa 199 (1865). Under the competing "Cooley Doctrine" some state constitutions are understood to create
an absolute right to local self-government, which cannot be abridged by the state legislature. Cooley's view
was that local governments pre-dated the formation of state governments and therefore should be treated as
parallel to the state, rather than as creatures of the state. People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 9 Am. Rep. 103
(Mich. 1871).
174

See HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY

OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870 235 (1983) (stating that the strict construction of delegations
to local govermments "provided one [important] technique for justifying judicial intervention" to block
actions judges regarded as unwarranted).
175 Paul D. Mowery et al., The Impact of State Preemption of Local Smoking Restrictions on Public
Health Protectionsand Changes in Social Norms, 2012 J. ENVTL. & PUB. HEALTH 1, 2 (2012).
176 See, e.g., Dale Kunkel & Doug Taren, Pre-emptive Bill on Fast Food and Kids Reeks of Hollow

Politics, ARIZ. DAILY STAR (March 1, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://tucson.com/news/opiion/pre-emptive-billon-fast-food-and-kids-reeks-of/article 8046095d-6650-506d-9el5-876ab1d64lfO.html.
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Public health advocates would do well to take note that the preemption proposals
backed by GM producers go even farther than those deployed against tobacco control
and anti-obesity regulations. In 2013, while Kauai and the County of Hawaii were
considering GMO and pesticide legislation, a breathtakingly broad preemption bill was
introduced in the Hawaii state legislature. State Senator Donovan Dela Cruz's proposal
would have amended the Hawaii state code section that grants each county
government authority to pass legislation "deemed necessary to protect health, life, and
property, and to preserve the order and security of . . . its inhabitants.""' The bill
would have removed "health" and "life" from that list. 7
Broad preemption does not always require an express choice by the legislature. In
many cases, the judiciary implies preemption based on the mere existence of a state or
federal regulatory scheme, including where that scheme is "intentionally
deregulatory," as the plaintiffs in Syngenta alleged federal GMO law to be.1 79 Notably,
the federal district judge found that the state legislature intended to preempt local
government enactments like Kauai's ordinance, even though legislative efforts to enact
preemption statutes specifically aimed at the Kauai ordinance (including a narrower
pair of bills that would have revised Hawaii's "Right to Farm" legislation by adding
language to specifically bar local governments from enacting legislation prohibiting
the use of "agricultural technology, modem livestock production, and ranching
practices" that are legal under state and federal law) failed.18 0
C. INCREASING FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR COMMERCIAL SPEECH

The Grocery Manufacturers Association plaintiffs characterize Vermont's
mandate that they disclose genetic engineering on food labels as "compel[ling]
manufacturers to use their labels to convey an opinion with which they disagree,
namely, that consumers should assign significance to the fact that a product contains
an ingredient derived from a genetically engineered plant." 8 They also allege that the
labeling requirement imposes a content-based burden on protected speech, which
should prompt heightened scrutiny.182 Although some public health advocates might
not approve of Vermont's GMO labeling mandate and advertising restrictions,18 the
First Amendment issues raised by the Vermont statute are a major focus for public
health lawyers, who should watch the case closely. Increasing First Amendment
protection for commercial speech (and uncertainty regarding the evolving standards
applied by the Supreme Court) has had an enormous impact on the development of
public health law in recent years. Some suggest that the failure of advertising
restrictions has prompted regulators to turn to product and retailer regulations, like the

177
178

S. 727, 27th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2013).
Id.

Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. County of Kauai, Civ. No. 1:14-CV-00014-BMK, 2014 WL 4216022, at
*8-13 (D. Haw. Aug. 25, 2014).
"s In January 2014, shortly after the Kauai and Hawaii County ordinances were adopted, somewhat
less broad preemption bills were introduced in the state legislature. Identical bills introduced in the House
and Senate would have revised Hawaii's "Right to Farm" legislation by adding language to specifically bar
local governments from enacting legislation prohibiting the use of "agricultural technology, modern
livestock production, and ranching practices" that are legal under state and federal law. H.R. 2506, 27th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2014); S. 3058, 27th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2014). Both bills died in committee.
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 13, Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14CV-117 (D. Vt. June 12, 2014).
182 Id. (citing Sorrellv. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011)).
179

...See Ross H. Pifer, Mandatory Labeling Laws: What Do Recent State Enactments Portendfor the
Future ofG MOs?, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 789, 808 (2014).
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Ohio trans fat ban and New York City's Sugary Drinks Portion Rule, that are more
intrusive upon individual choice. 8
1. Advertising Restrictions
Prior to the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court held that commercial advertising,
was entirely unprotected by the First Amendment.18
along with obscenity and libel,
When the Court first departed from this longstanding precedent, it continued to
recognize the "'common-sense' distinction between speech proposing a commercial
transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and
other varieties of speech."18 7 In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service
Commission of New York,'" the Court adopted a four-part intermediate scrutiny test
for establishing whether a restriction on commercial speech (such as Act 120's
prohibition on the use of the term "natural" to market GM foods and proposed
restrictions on the marketing of unhealthy food and beverage products to children)
violates the First Amendment. First, commercial speech is not protected by the First
Amendment if it promotes unlawful activity or is false, deceptive, or misleading (Step
1). To regulate truthful advertising with regard to lawful activity, the government must
have a "substantial" interest in regulating the speech (Step 2), and the regulation must
"directly advance[] the governmental interest asserted" (Step 3) and must be no "more
extensive than is necessary to serve" the stated governmental interest (Step 4).189
Particularly with regard to public health regulation, commentators have noted that
the Court appears to be applying Central Hudson in a way that closely approximates
strict scrutiny.190 The Court has struck down regulations with public health
significance in LorillardTobacco Co. v. Reilly (2001),191 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island (1996),192 Rubin v. Coors (1995),193 and Thompson v. Western States Medical
Center (2002),194 and Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. (2012).195 These regulations have
typically faltered on the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test, which
focus on the closeness of fit between the government's purpose and the regulation
under attack, with the Court essentially applying the least-restrictive means test usually
reserved for strict scrutiny analysis.196

184

See Cleveland, 989 N.E.2d 1072, 1081 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013); Rachael Williams, How Growing

Legislation Geared Towards RestrictingAmerica's Expanding Waist Lines Is Restricting Consumer Choice,
22 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 145, 155 (2014).
185 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1942).
18
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) ("We are equally clear that the Constitution
imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.").
187 Ohraliky. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978).
188 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).

Id. at 566.
Seth E. Mermin & Samantha K. Graff, The FirstAmendment and Public Health, at Odds, 39 AM.
J.L. & MED. 298, 299 n.11 (2013); Samantha Rauer, Note, When the FirstAmendment and Public Health
Collide: The Court's Increasingly Strict Constitutional Scrutiny of Health Regulations that Restrict
Commercial Speech, 38 AM. J.L. MED. 690, 691 (2012).
189

190

191
192
193
194
195
196

Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
Thompsonv. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 U.S. 2653 (2011).
Rauer, supra note 190, at 703.
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2. Disclosure Mandates
Because disclosure requirements (like the GMO labeling mandate or cigarette
warning labels) "trench much more narrowly on an advertiser's interests than do flat
prohibitions on speech," 1 9 7 the First Amendment interests implicated by disclosure
requirements are substantially weaker than those at stake when speech is suppressed.
In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, the Supreme Court held that laws
requiring the disclosure of commercial information are constitutional as long as they
are reasonably related to the state's asserted interest. 198 The Court emphasized that
commercial speakers have only a "minimal" interest in refusing to disclose "factual
and noncontroversial" information about their products. 199
In 2009, the Second Circuit applied the Zauderer standard to uphold New York's
200
chain restaurant menu labeling mandate.
Other courts, however, are beginning to
signal that the lenient Zauderer standard might not apply to some warning labels and
disclosure mandates. The circuit courts are split, for example, over whether Zauderer
applies only when the government is seeking to prevent "deception of consumers" (the
state interest at issue in Zauderer itself). This issue has enormous implications for
warning labels-such as graphic warnings for cigarette packs-that are aimed at
201
discouraging consumption of a harmful product.
The Grocery Manufacturers Association plaintiffs attempt to restrict Zauderer
further by asserting that the disclosures compelled by Act 120 (e.g., that the labeled
product was "produced with genetic engineering") are "controversial"-presumably
because there is controversy over the import of the disclosed statement.202 Similarly,
their argument that Act 120 compels them to make statements with which they do not
agree203 conflates the straightforward factual statement mandated by the law with the
controversy over the import of the fact that is disclosed.

Zaudererv. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
198 Id. But see Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 146-47 (1994) (finding
the exhaustive disclaimer required in certain accountant advertisements to be overbroad).
197

199
200

Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.

NYSRA II, 556 F.3d 114, 136 (2d Cir. 2009).
The 2012 circuit courts' decisions assessing proposed graphic warning labels for cigarette packs are
split over the applicability of Zauderer. The Sixth Circuit, in a challenge to the 2009 Tobacco Control Act,
applied Zauderer and upheld the statute's requirement of graphic warnings. The court found the warnings
were needed to correct "decades-long deception by Tobacco Companies" and that "advertising promoting
smoking deceives consumers if it does not warn consumers about tobacco's serious health risks." Disc.
Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 562 (6th Cir. 2012). In a lawsuit challenging
the FDA's final rule on graphic warning labels, the D.C. Circuit disagreed and invalidated the rule, holding
that FDA's interest in requiring graphic wamings-disclosure of health and safety risks-was not, alone,
sufficient justification. The court found that the agency had not shown the labels were needed to prevent
deception; therefore the Zauderer test was inapplicable. In 2014, the D.C. Circuit expressly overruled this
holding in an unrelated case, but the FDA had already withdrawn its proposed warnings to avoid Supreme
Court review. Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 22-23 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (finding that
"Zauderer's characterization of the speaker's interest in opposing forced disclosure of [purely factual and
uncontroversial] information as "minimal" seems inherently applicable beyond the problem of deception"
and expressly overruling previous holdings "limiting Zauderer to cases in which the govermment points to an
interest in correcting deception .
(citing R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205,
1214)(2012)).
202 Plaintiffs' [Proposed] Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 17, Grocery
Mfrs. Ass'nv. Sorrell, No. 5:14-CV-117-CR (D. Vt. Sept. 11, 2014).
201

203 Id. at 14.

309

D.

DEREGULATION, DISTRUST, AND DEMOCRACY

THE EROSION OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO LEGISLATIVE POLICY JUDGMENTS

The Syngenta plaintiffs assert that the ordinance infringes upon their Equal
Protection and Due Process rights under the federal and Hawaii state constitutions.2 0 4
These claims allege that the laws at issue fail to satisfy rational basis review.205 In their
motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs argued that (1) the pesticide provisions
specifically targeted the plaintiffs rather than applying to all pesticide users, (2) the
threshold amount of pesticides used to trigger the ordinance was arbitrary because it
was not linked to proportions or the amount of harmful ingredients used, and (3) the
206
GMO disclosure requirements served no legitimate purpose.
Similarly, the Statewide Coalition plaintiffs argued that the New York City
Portion Rule was "laden with arbitrary exceptions."207 The trial judge found that the
rule was "fraught with arbitrary and capricious consequences," pointing to exceptions
for convenience stores, alcoholic beverages, and dairy drinks.208 The Grocery
ManufacturersAssociation plaintiffs point to Act 120's statutory exemptions for some
products that include ingredients derived from GE plants, without specifically raising
209
Other food regulations are vulnerable to similar
an Equal Protection challenge.
questions: Why artificial but not natural trans fats? Why prepared foods but not
packaged foods, or vice versa?
These claims seem destined to fail, based on long-standing precedents applying
rational basis review to legislative distinctions that do not amount to "suspect"
classifications (limited to race, national origin, religion, and alienage) and
infringements upon interests that do not amount to "fundamental" rights (i.e., those
enumerated in the constitution, such as freedom of expression, as well as others
recognized by the Supreme Court, such as privacy). There is no fundamental right to
210
sell, purchase, or use particular products or services in particular configurations,
whether we're talking about GM foods, thirty-two ounce sodas containing more than
twenty-two teaspoons of sugar, or large quantities of pesticides. Drawing a distinction
between high-volume and low-volume pesticide users, or between food service
establishments and other retailers who sell sugary drinks or packaged foods containing

204 See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Claims One,
Three, Four, and Five of First Amended Complaint at 39, Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. County of Kauai, No.
1:14-CV-00014-BMK (D. Haw. Apr. 14, 2014).
205 Id. (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)).
206 Id. at 41-46.
207 Verified Article 78 & Declaratory Judgment Petition at 29, NY Statewide Coal. II, 110 A.D.3d 1
(N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (No. 653584/12).
208 NY Statewide Coal. I, No. 653584/12, 2013 WL 1343607 at, *20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013).
209 Plaintiffs' [Proposed] Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 17, Grocery
Mfrs. Ass'nv. Sorrell, No. 5:14-CV-117-CR (D. Vt. Sept. 11, 2014).
210 See, e.g., Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (holding that terminally ill adult patients had no fundamental right protected by the Due Process
Clause to have access to investigational drugs, after surveying the long history of safety and efficacy
regulation of drugs for personal use); Lange-Kesslerv. Dep't of Educ., 109 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding
that the right to privacy does not encompass a woman's right to choose a direct-entry midwife to assist
during childbirth). See also Samuel R. Wiseman, Liberty of Palate, 65 ME. L. REV. 737, 744 (2013)
(concluding that there is no constitutionally protected right to consume the foods of one's choosing, based
on "the long history of curtailment of food choice, and the lack of any constitutional protection or tradition
of broadly protecting food rights . . ."). "[T]he Court declared decades ago its 'abandonment of the use of the
"vague contours" of the Due Process Clause to nullify laws which a majority of the Court believed to be
economically unwise."' In re Late Fee and Over-limit Fee Litig., 741 F.3d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 725, 731 (1963)); see also Michael J. Phillips, Another Look at

Economic Substantive Due Process, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 265

constitutionally protected economic rights).

(1987)

(describing the rejection of
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trans fats, does not amount to a suspect classification. As such, food regulations should
be struck down by courts on the basis of manufacturers' and retailers' rights to Due
Process and Equal Protection only if they are not rationally related to a legitimate
government interest.211
Historically, courts have applied rational basis review in a way that defers to
legislative judgments with regard to policy matters, and have given government actors
broad leeway to take an incremental, under-inclusive approach to regulation.212 But
recent Supreme Court and circuit court decisions have imposed more demanding
standards on the defenders of government regulation, even in cases that are
purportedly within the province of rational basis review. In the short term, courts are
unlikely to use equal protection or due process rights to strike down anti-GMO or
public health initiatives, particularly when other, less radical avenues are available
(e.g., First Amendment, preemption). But over the long term, industry groups may
have some realistic hope that courts will become more receptive to these arguments,
which would represent a full return to Lochnerism. 213
An argument made by the Grocery Manufacturer's Association plaintiffs in the
context of their First Amendment claim suggests another, more dramatic avenue that
industry groups might use to invalidate economic regulations pursuant to a more
demanding form of rational basis review. Even under the lesser protection afforded to
commercial speech, they argue, Act 120 should fail because "the State's interest in this
mandate is not a governmental interest" at all: "In adopting Act 120, the State acted as
a pass-through for advocates of controversial views that the State did not purport to
endorse, and that are based on conjecture about 'unintended consequences' that the
State did not bother to substantiate, or even investigate."214 The plaintiffs draw a
distinction between "consumer" interests and state interests,215 categorizing the former
,216
This argument goes beyond the holding of the Second Circuit,
as "purely private."
in a case striking down a Vermont law mandating disclosure of the use of growth in
dairy production, that consumer curiosity is not a substantialgovernmental interest.217
If accepted, the plaintiffs' argument would amount to a determination that the state has
no legitimate interest in ensuring that consumers have access to information that they
deem relevant because that interest is not a governmental interest at all. The suggestion
that when the state acts as a "pass-through" for voter interests it does not act in its
governmental capacity is bold and (fortunately) unsupported by law. 21 8 But the effort

211

See United Statesv. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).

212 Aaron Belzer, Putting the "Review" Back in Rational BasisReview, 41 W. ST. U. L. REV. 339, 342-

50 (2014).
213 For a discussion of Lochnerism see Barry Cushman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes of
Lochnerism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 881 (2005).

Plaintiffs' [Proposed] Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 15, Grocery
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-CV-117-CR (D. Vt. Sept. 11, 2014) (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,
131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011)) (citing Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 73 n.1 (2d Cir.
1996)).
215 Id. at 11 (citing the findings and statement of purpose of Act 120).
214

216

Id. at 16.

See Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n, 92 F.3d at 73 (holding that "strong consumer interest and the public's
'right to know"'-in contrast to "health and safety concems"-are "insufficient to justify compromising
protected constitutional rights").
218 In addition to citing Int'l Dairy Foods Ass n, the plaintiffs quote the Supreme Court's use of the
term "governmental interest" in IMS Health. Plaintiffs Proposed Amended Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief, supra note 214, at 15. By adding emphasis to the word "governmental," the plaintiffs
imply that IMS Health supports the idea that an interest may be deemed non-governmental, but in fact, IMS
217

Health, like Int'l Dairy Foods Ass n, focused on the substantiality of the governmental interest, not its
governmental nature.
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to characterize a problem as "private" and thus not within the legitimate province of
governmental concern has proven to be quite compelling in a range of public health
contexts.2 1 9
III. DEMOCRACY AND EXPERTISE AT THE INTERSECTION OF LAW AND
SCIENCE
Public health, food justice, alternative food, and environmental advocates would
do well to highlight the deeply counter-majoritarian impulse behind the legal
arguments that industry groups use to challenge food reform regulations. My
suggestion that these groups, which are characterized by divergent perspectives on the
mainstream scientific community and the public perception of risk, should collaborate
on foundational legal issues like preemption and the appropriate scope of judicial
review, which raise important and difficult questions about the appropriate roles for
democracy and expertise at the intersection of law and science. How much should the
judiciary defer to legislative decisions about uncertain health and environmental risks?
Should the purported First Amendment, Due Process, Equal Protection rights of
regulated industries trigger judicial review that demands firm scientific evidence that
their conduct creates a definite risk and that the challenged regulation will effectively
and substantially reduce that risk? Or should the concerns that animate the populace be
sufficient to justify precautionary regulation, even when expert assessments do not
support those concerns or the interventions the public supports to address them? As
risk perception expert Paul Slovic cautions, "there is wisdom as well as error in public
attitudes and perceptions." 2 2 0

A.

EXPERTISE VERSUS DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IN AGENCY DECISION-MAKING

Statewide Coalition highlighted the tensions between expertise-driven regulation
and democratic representation. Some advocates insist that the legitimacy and authority
of agencies "should derive . . . from their . . . expertise and freedom from industry
capture, not their democratic bona fides."
Under this view, agencies should have
broader discretion to act within their sphere of expertise. Other advocates, however,
conceive of public health action primarily as a manifestation of the democratic
222
process: communities working together to create healthier living conditions.
Certainly, "laws that emerge from a democratic process [may be] more secure than
,223
equally paternalistic administrative regulations."
Yet, the question persists: should
the executive branch, based on greater expertise, be given leeway to intervene when

219

See generally Lindsay F. Wiley, Rethinking the New Public Health, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207

(2012) (discussing the public/private distinction as central to debates over the legitimate scope of public
health law).
220
221

PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 191 (Ragnar E. Ldfstedt ed., 2000).
Rick Hills, The Soda Portion Cap, Redux: Why Are New York City's Agencies More Constrained

than Federal Agencies?, PRAWFSBLAWG (July 30, 2013, 3:19 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2013 /07/the-soda-portion-cap-redux-why-are-new-york-citys-agencies-more-constrained-thanfederal-agencies.html#comments.
222 See Lindsay F. Wiley et al., Who's Your Nanny? Choice, Paternalism and Public Health in the Age
ofPersonalResponsibility, 41 JL. MED. & ETHICS (SPECIAL ISSUE) 88 (2013).
223
Scott Burris,
George at APHA
I, BILL OF HEALTH
(November 12,
2013),

http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2013/11/12/george-at-apha-i/
Parmet).

(describing a presentation by Wendy
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politics prevent legislative action? Or does executive overreach risk public
backlash?2 2 4
Still others argue that the comparative advantage of local agencies is speed, not
science:
Local executives can act quickly to launch a quick policy
experiment in a limited geographic area. The science justifying these
experiments should follow rather than precede the local policy .... Yes,
there is a danger that some local experiments will misfire . . . [b]ut the
alternative might be that we remain locked in a status quo in which no
one does anything, because the executive actors are bogged down by a
judicially created quagmire of process and non-delegation canons, while
the legislative actors are stuck in the gridlock of partisan acrimony and
fear of risk-taking. A nation locked into such dreary regulatory
uniformity by judicial demands for detailed legislative delegations of
power cannot generate the data necessary to determine whether further
legislation is a good idea. The likely result is a vicious circle of courtinduced Catch-22: Courts suppress local experiments citing lack of highquality data, but those local experiments are precisely the data needed
for scientific expertise to determine the effects of those local policies. 225
The legal basis of the Statewide Coalition decision's insistence that legislatures,
rather than administrative agencies, are the appropriate body to "wrestle with complex
value judgments concerning personal autonomy and economics" was rooted in New
226
York's atypically stringent non-delegation doctrine.
Nonetheless, as a matter of
political accountability and transparency, it is an admonition that public health and
environmental groups should take to heart. And critics of the Portion Rule should note
that these arguments ring equally true with regard to the role of the judiciary.

B. UNCERTAINTY

AND PRECAUTION

With regard to public health interventions, especially in the areas of tobacco
control and healthy eating, the primary evidentiary hurdle relates to the likely impact
227
of challenged regulations.
Comparatively, with regard to GMO regulation, the
primary evidentiary hurdle relates to the seriousness of the risks that challenged
regulations seek to address.228 During debate over the Hawaii County ordinance, for
See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Bloomberg's Health Legacy: Urban Innovator or Meddling Nanny?, 43
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 19 (2013); David P. Borden, Commentary, Innovative Policies Under Bloomberg's
New' Public Health, 44 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 6 (2014); Peter D. Jacobson & Wendy E. Parmet,
Commentary, DefendingPublic Health Regulations: The Message Is the Medium, 44 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 4
(2014); Roger Magnusson, Commentary, Bloomberg, Hitchens, and the Libertarian Critique, 44 HASTINGS
CTR. REP. 3 (2014); Emily Whelan Parento, Commentary, The Affordable Care Act and the Needfor Public
Health Leadership, 44 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 7 (2014).
225 Hills, supra note
221.
226 N.Y. Statewide Coal. III, 16 N.E.3d 538,
548 (N.Y. 2014).
227 See generally B. Ashby Hardesty, Jr., Joe Camel Versus Uncle Sam:
The Constitutionality of
GraphicCigarette Warning Labels, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2811 (2013); Bradford J. Patrick, Snuffing out the
FirstAmendment: The FDA Regulation of Tobacco Company Advertising and Sports Scholarships Under
the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, 8 MARQ. SPORTS L. J. 139 (1997); Ashley Arthur, Note,
Combating Obesity: Our Country's Need for a National Standardto Replace the Growing Patchwork of
Local Menu LabelingLaws, 7 IND. HEALTHL. REV. 305 (2010).
228 Tamar Haspel, Genetically Modified Foods: What Is and Isn't True, WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 2013),
224

http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/food/genetically-modified-foods-what-is-and-isnttrue/2013/10/15/40e4fd58-3132-1 1e3-8627-c5d7deOaO46b_story.html.
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example, "[c]ritics of GMOs insisted that such crops might cause cancer, birth
deformities, tumors, sterility and even widespread devastation,"229 but these dramatic
risks are not borne out by respected scientific evidence.
Anti-GMO interventions adopt a strongly precautionary stance that should
resonate with public health groups even if the prioritization of GMO regulation does
not sit well with them.230 In the face of uncertainty, should governments step in to
control the risks, at least in limited ways? Although the evidence that diets high in
calories, sugar, salt, and fat negatively impact health is on sounder footing than the
evidence that GMOs cause direct harm to human health, public health advocates would
do well to remember that the evidence base for many promising healthy eating and
tobacco control interventions is vulnerable to attack. For many complex problems, it
may take decades before the epidemiological evidence clearly supports a
comprehensive solution. In such cases, government actors must rely upon the evidence
before them in developing an initial, albeit incremental and under-inclusive, response.
Critically, such first regulatory steps often serve as a "laboratory" for researchers and
regulators, furnishing important evidence that can be used to guide subsequent steps
and, in some cases, comprehensive regulation.231

C. RISK

PERCEPTION

Increased coordination among health, food, and environmental advocacy groups
also raises interesting questions about the different approaches to risk perception taken
by environmental law and public health law experts. Pointing to the psychological
literature on risk perception, Doug Kysar, who compellingly champions the legitimacy
232
of governmental interest in regulating GMOs to effectuate consumer preferences,
challenges sterile cost-benefit analysis on the grounds that "individual responses to
even actuarially identical risks vary dramatically based on the risks' qualitative
characteristics."233 In the place of an expert-driven assessment of the value that should
be placed on a statistical life, Kysar advocates for policy choices "premised on social
values, explicitly discussed and mediated through democratic decision-making
,,234
processes.
This approach would vaunt "the virtues of collective problem solving
[by] consider[ing] the reasonableness of ends in relation to the sacrifices we must
,235
make to achieve them."
Harkening back to the "messy, pluralistic, and pragmatic"
approach of the 1970s,236 before environmental protection "came to be disciplined by
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the insights of sound science and economic reasoning,"237 Kysar aims to restore
"practical and moral wisdom" to environmental law.2 38
In contrast, public health law experts generally adopt a far more skepticaleven authoritarian-stance toward public risk perception.239 Cognitive biases cause
people to make choices about tobacco, food, and alcohol consumption; how they drive;
how they store firearms in their homes; and a whole host of other matters that do not
reflect rational self-interest.240 Industries marketing harmful products exploit these
biases deftly, and public health advocates often see their role as the champion of
rational risk perception: urging consumers to see that the greatest threats to the health
and safety of their families are mundane but grossly underestimated risks like heart
disease and car crashes rather than exotic and grossly overestimated risks like Ebola
and birth defects caused by consumption of trace amounts of pesticides in non-organic
produce.
The stance of various public health-oriented food reform advocates on GM food
labeling provides insight into how they navigate the tension between expertise-driven
reforms and democratic recognition of consumer values. While CSPI has opposed
labeling mandates on the grounds that labeling might reinforce the mistaken notion
that non-GM foods are safer, the American Public Health Association (APHA) has
taken a different stance. Its 2001 resolution in support of mandated labeling of GM
foods largely elides the food safety concerns expressed by many anti-GMO advocates
in favor of focusing on honoring consumers' desire for accurate information. The
resolution emphasizes that that "opposition to labeling based on findings that
genetically modified food products are safe discounts issues of consumer choice and
bioethical concerns," and that "food labeling makes possible a range of legitimate
consumer interests ranging from a desire to avoid allergic reactions to the opportunity
1
to exercise informed buying decisions." 2 4
The long-standing struggle of public health experts to combat widespread
misperception about health, safety, and environmental risks will make it challenging
for them to adopt the pro-democratic, collective problem-solving approach that I and
others have advocated is the best path forward from industry-fueled "nanny state"
criticisms.242 Public health advocates could take a page from environmentalists in this
regard. As Kysar puts it: "[E]nvironmental law must form part of the social glue that
binds a political community together in pursuit of long-term and uncertain goals. To
serve that function, in turn, laws must have continuity with the concepts, values, and
,243
discourses expressed by real people."
The same could be said of public health law,
which prominent advocates are seeking to recast as the product of communities
coming together to achieve collectively what they cannot achieve individually.
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